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We live in a time of major change. A new global economic architecture is emerging, 
a one that is set to define development trends for decades to come. The recent crisis prompted 
a global quest for new patterns of strategic development, and today many countries are 
looking to form and consolidate regional unions. 
Development economics appeared after World War II with the purpose of helping 
developing countries industrialize their economies, reducing poverty and narrowing the 
income gap with advanced countries. The second half of the twentieth century has been 
characterized by an unprecedented progress in both global and regional economic 
integration, and the process of growth and development has always been a major concern 
for economists. From a geopolitical and socio-economic perspective, the end of World War 
II marked the beginning of a new era in which the international community showed great 
resolve in working together to restore the international economy through increased economic 
integration among liberal capitalist countries. Later, an increasing number of developing 
countries, as well as the majority of former communist nations, begun to undertake a 
transition to more open markets.  
The advance of the different schools throughout the history of economic thought, from 
the Physiocrats School to new institutional theory, has unveiled economists’ concerns 
regarding the different issues of economic development. These concerns have been 
motivated by the willingness to comprehend the process of economic growth and structural 
change as well as the route leading to an improvement in the standard of living (Altman M., 
2011). Mercantilism, Classical and Neoclassical economists gave special attention to the 
international division of labour, gains from trade and their contribution to growth. 
Differences in the levels of productivity in labour and capital among countries would suggest 
removing the barriers to free trade, with the purpose of making every country’s economy 
register higher levels of competitiveness and efficiency in the supply of goods and services. 
In turn, alongside with them we should take into account other relevant factors, such as new 
technologies, entrepreneurial capacity, competitive advantages of countries, investment in 
human capital accumulation, product differentiation strategies as well as the increasing 
returns to scale obtained as a result of enjoying from the former factors. From an economic 
policy perspective, the continuing efforts to liberalize international trade on a multilateral 
basis—first under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and now World Trade 
Introduction 
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Organization (WTO1)—have contributed to better market access and to higher rates of 
growth of international current account transactions, much above the world’s economic rate 
of growth. This higher trade growth in comparison with output’s one has been caused by the 
increasing relevance of developing countries in world’s commerce figures. The creation of 
new trade linkages between developing and developed countries has transformed 
international supply chains, requiring higher quantities of low cost input supplies from 
emerging nations, thus boosting trade creation. 
Since the Second World War, there have been several integration initiatives involving 
countries from the developed regions of the world, but in recent years this process has also 
reached nearly all countries (EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SADC2) including not 
only developed but also developing countries (UEMOA, ECOWAS, SADC, EurAsEC3).   
Looking back at the beginning of the 21st century, which has been characterized by a 
higher uncertainty, some relevant trends can be observed. One of them is the invasive nature 
of technology (Kalish, 2016). Another trend is the substantial change in the system of 
relations between states and societies, from an international to a global configuration setting. 
At this regard, the analysis of the two concepts related to these changes, integration and 
globalization, is particularly important (Vakhitova, 2002). Although we know that the terms 
integration and globalization are different in the contemporary discourse, both are sometimes 
holding a similar sense, implying that the integration process would lead to a higher 
globalization level. 
In most cases, theories of economic integration and its benefits – not only the dynamic 
ones, but also the static ones -, are not fully applicable to integration agreements among 
developing and least developed countries. Meier (1960) claims that Viner’s analysis has 
limited or no relevance to integration among developing countries. Even Balassa (Balassa, 
1965, p.16) states that theoretical literature on economic integration issues discusses customs 
unions only in industrialized countries. Developed nations’ problems and environment are 
1 By late 2013 seven of the twelve non-Baltic countries had acceded to the WTO, i. e., in order of accession, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan. Four others 
were in the process of WTO accession, namely, in order of requested membership, Belarus, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Turkmenistan has started to prepare for an eventual accession process (WTO, 
2013). 
2 European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
3 West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEOMA), Economic Community of West African States 









not related to economic development, but more to relative changes of production and 
consumption features. 
The present Ph.D. thesis states that economic integration is the union of economic 
policies among states consisting of a process of free movement of products, services capital 
and labor between regions. Integration, along with other generally accepted conditions of 
economic dynamics, such as the growth of scientific and technological progress, capital 
investment as well as investment in human capital. The gradual development of a regional 
economic integration organization on the basis of a free trade zone, customs union, common 
market, economic and monetary union and economic union is largely aimed at simplifying 
interregional trade and deepening integration ties. The latter highlights not only the sequence 
of the development of integration processes ascending from the lowest to the highest level, 
but also characterizes better the degree of maturity of regional economic integration. Another 
objective of integration is to increase the effectiveness of economic growth and equalize the 
living standards of the population of different regions within the framework of an integration 
association, which initially includes the main types of economic integration, directions and 
scales of regional development, as well as principles and approaches that ultimately 
contribute to the development of interregional trade. Moreover, the main types, principles, 
directions and approaches of trade and economic interaction of regions, being objects of 
systemic study in specific socio-economic, political and geographical conditions, are 
synthesized in order to develop an optimal model of economic integration in the context of 
regional trade and economic cooperation. In this way, the present Ph.D. thesis examine the 
channels through which regional integration affects poverty in CIS countries. Many 
politicians and researchers discuss the link between regional integration and poverty. 
However, direct empirical evidence on these links in the case of CIS countries has received 
relatively less attention. Conceptually, there are various channels through which regional 
trading agreements might impact poverty but much depends on what is included or excluded 
from any given agreement and on what is actually implemented and how.  
 
1.2. Literature review   
 
Many authors claim that economic integration theory goes through two development 
stages, each of which addresses the political and economic issues relevant for its time. The 









possible benefits of integration and are often referred to as static analysis. The second stage 
includes the new economic integration theories, which are developed in changed economic 
conditions and trade environment – they are referred to as dynamic analysis of economic 
arrangements (Golovnin, 2013). 
Viner claims that trade creation increases a country’s welfare while trade diversion 
reduces it. When speaking about the role of Customs unions on increasing economic welfare 
he says: “…customs union is only a partial, uncertain, and otherwise imperfect mean of 
doing what a world-wide non-discriminatory reduction of trade barriers can do more fully, 
more certainly, and equitably…” (Viner, 1950, с. 135). What Viner’s theory practically 
means is that countries would have motivation to participate in integration if it could possibly 
bring more benefits than costs, or, in other words – when integration leads to more trade 
creation than trade diversion. 
A conventional method of empirical assessment of regional trade agreements uses a 
gravity modeling approach, which allows conducting econometric estimation of bilateral 
trade flows and assessing the impact of dummy variables. Since the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union there have been numerous studies discussing various aspects of disintegration and 
reintegration. 
From an empirical point of view, however, the trade-growth link is still under 
discussion, from both a methodological perception and regarding the size and significance 
of the estimated effects (IMF, №WP/07/156, 2007). Even more than twenty years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union there still remain significant – albeit diminishing and varying 
in individual cases – economic, trade, language and cultural linkages among the former 
Soviet Union republics. However, during the Soviet era, external trade in services was 
extremely limited. Given the modern growth of the international trade in goods, trade in 
services analysis demands a separate consideration for transition economies in general. 
Moreover, the independence of Central Asian states fragmented the Central Asian Region 
not only from a political point of view but also from an economic one. Carrere and Grigoriou 
(2008:3) stated, “the Soviet Union’s collapse4 was expected to lead to a major reorientation 
of each post-Soviet republic’s trade pattern, since politically determined commercial links 
under central planning had given rise to a substantial over-trading amongst post-Soviet 
states”. In consequence, certain sluggishness in regional trade growth was expected and 
                                                 










hence commercial integration agreements were essential from the beginning. Besides, after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all countries went through severe structural shocks and 
deep economic crises (Vinokurov and Libman, 2012). Sebastian and Dienes (2019) argue 
that that the failure of regionalism in Central Asia is due to two interrelated factors: firstly, 
as in other developing regions of the global south, intraregional economic interdependence 
is low in Central Asia. This does not mean that there exists no demand for regional 
integration in Central Asia, but the demand is different to that among economically well-
developed regional organisations such as the European Union (EU). Central Asian 
economies are dependent on exports of agricultural products and a few commodities such as 
gas and oil to extra-regional 
markets. Additionally, they all share the fundamental infrastructure problems of landlocked 
countries at the periphery of the global market (Bobokulov 2006; Myant and Drahokoupil 
2008).  
Second, as long as the success of regionalism depends very much on taking a united 
stance in relation to extra-regional actors, however Central Asia is subject of the ‘Second 
Great5 Game’, wherein extra-regional powers—most notably China and Russia—compete 
for access to Central Asia’s fossil resources (Cooley 2012). 
In spite of technological improvements in transport, landlocked developing countries 
continue to face structural challenges to accessing world markets (Faye et al., 2003). 
Whereas a number of authors argue on the poor infrastructure of many landlocked countries, 
however there are other positive factors such as dependence on neighbors’ infrastructure, 
cross-border political relations, and political stability.  
Landlocked countries not only do they face the obstacle of distance, but also the 
challenges that result from a dependence on passaging through a sovereign transit country, 
in order to access international shipping markets. Individual country case studies on Central 
Asia focus mostly on the landlocked nature of those territories. For instance, Raballand6 
(2003) assessed the negative impact of landlockedness on Central Asian countries' trade 
                                                 
5 In the context of the ‘Second Great Game’, the Central Asian countries basically have two options. On the 
one hand, they can attempt to develop a unified regional stance in relation to extra-regional actors and to profit 
from the rivalry between China and Russia. This strategy has been successfully applied by the Southeast Asian 
countries, which use the regional organization ASEAN in order to cooperate with the extra-regional powers 
China and Japan (Krapohl 2017b). 
6 Raballand (2003) analyzed the effect of landlockedness on trade in the case of Central Asian countries. Using 
a restricted sample of 46 CIS countries, 18 of which landlocked, over a period of 5 years (1995-1999), he found 










affairs and found that the number of border crossings along with long distance was crucial 
to explaining the low level of trade flows. Grigorou (2007) and Carrere and Grigorou (2008) 
looked at the three factors that matter for the region: overland transportation costs, 
bargaining power with transit countries and the infrastructure of the latter. Moreover, among 
these three components, only transit countries’ infrastructure is specific to Central Asia: 
improvements in infrastructure of the transit-country reduce trade costs three times more for 
Central Asian countries than for other landlocked countries. 
Estache and Goicoechea (2005) have also analysed the case of Central Asian countries. 
These authors have shown that Central Asia suffers from low levels of transport and 
communications’ infrastructure. For instance, railway density is on average 5.4 rail-km per 
1,000 sq. km, i.e. one-third of the average railway density of low- and middle-income 
countries. This is a particular cause for concern given that approximately 90% of total freight 
transport in Central Asian countries during 2000 was by rail. It is therefore fair to say that 
low infrastructure levels are likely to affect Central Asian trade, and that the lack of 
investment in existing infrastructure increases transport costs. 
The next factor that the present thesis has taken into account is the Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) amongst Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. Most 
countries involved in FTAs anticipate the achievement of two objectives: trade promotion 
and an increase in economic growth. Although it is taught in many undergraduate textbooks 
that openness to international trade bolsters economic growth, the question as to whether a 
positive relationship exists between free trade and economic growth has posed a significant 
challenge to economists, both theoretically and empirically, since Adam Smith. On the 
theoretical side, the so-called “endogenous growth theories” hold to the proposition that 
trade liberalization or greater openness may promote long-run economic growth under 
certain conditions. For example, Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Feenstra (1995) 
predicted that if a free trade system is formed under conditions in which technology transfer 
occurs between the involved economies, production efficiency can be improved, and thus 
free trade can ultimately induce economic growth among the FTA signatory countries. 
The post-Soviet states faced the double challenge of trying to establish in the first place 
a new economic relationship among them, an objective to be partially accomplished with the 
creation of the CIS countries. Additionally, it was clear from the 1990s that acceding to 
world markets was an unavoidable task for every country. However, it took a decade for the 









system. Whereas three of the former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have 
now joined the European Union (EU), other twelve countries are still struggling on their own 
to adjust their economies to the changing economic conditions and terms of trade. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet space appears to launch a wide variety of 
integration projects: Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Central Asia Regional 
Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), CIS, Customs Union (CU), Organization for 
Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), Single Economic Space (SES), Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Union State of Belarus and Russia. Some of them, such 
as CIS, were launched in an attempt to preserve economic, social, and political links after 
the USSR breakup; others, such as the CU, EurAsEC, and SES, aim at mainly fostering 
regional economic cooperation; while some, such as GUAM (Cooperation between Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or SCO, carry more political than economic weight in 
their agenda. It is obvious that none of these projects proved to be particularly efficient and 
worth comparing with widely recognized examples of good integration practice such as the 
European Union (Simon 2013, p. 21~22).  
Asian Development Bank (2006) pointed to more significant trade barriers owing to 
trade policy in Central Asia. First, they highlighted the relatively high tariffs embedded 
inside a complex tariff schedule. Secondly they warned about the frequent and unpredictable 
changes in the mentioned tariff schedule. Besides, high implicit tariffs in the form of taxes 
levied on imported goods but not on domestically produced goods are a frequent barrier to 
trade. Finally, yet importantly, the existence of not only explicit export taxes but also a 
required authorization of exports and imports of certain commodities have damaged the 
intra-regional trade dynamism. 
However, the importance of economic integration is a very pertinent issue among CIS 
countries, particularly in light of existing political and economic weaknesses. Most of CIS 
countries suffer the deepest levels of poverty, the lowest share of world trade, and the 
weakest development of human capital, institutions and infrastructure. It is because of this 
that several reasons have been attributed to CIS’s economic performance ranging from 
institutional or political to geographical factors.  
In geopolitical aspects, it is relevant to study the post‐Soviet region because as the 
analysis will demonstrate it has become an area of struggle of global and regional powers, 
the outcome of which, as well as the success of the CIS economic integration, will have an 









Despite the presence of internal and external conditions that stimulate the development 
of integration processes in the economic space of CIS countries, in practice, integration 
transformations in this region are carried out slowly and face many obstacles. This is due to 
the inertial effect of earlier mistakes, infringement of the rights of free historical choice of 
development paths, state monopoly, the inconvenient of economic stagnation and the 
disproportions in the pre-reform period. At the present stage, the multi-level and multi-speed 
nature of the integration processes in the CIS is more and more clearly manifested. They are 
localized within the active zones of integration (for example, the Organization for Regional 
Integration, the EurAsEC7), reflecting the desire of certain groups of states for optimal 
configurations and methods of interaction. At the same time, the negative influence of the 
zones of passivity and disintegration is increasing, contradictions in the relations of partners 
are growing in waves. This raises doubts and disappointments among the participants in the 
integration process, undermining faith in the necessity, results and prospects of its 
development in the CIS integration process8. Freinkman et al. (2004) concluded that the 
process of trade diversification away from the CIS9 remains incomplete in the CIS-710, and 
progress in the trade area was slower in the low-income CIS countries than in the high-
income CIS members. He suggests that the trade pattern corresponding to the five Central 
Asian11 countries and Moldova can still be considered intra-regional commerce, rather than 
a internationalized exchange with the rest of the world. Over the past decade years CIS 
countries have significantly diversified their geographical destinations for export of natural 
                                                 
7 The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC) was a regional organisation between 2000 and 
2014 which aimed for the economic integration of its member states. The organization originated from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 29 March 1996, with the treaty on the establishment of the 
Eurasian Economic Community signed on 10 October 2000 in Kazakhstan's capital Astana by Presidents 
Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, 
Vladimir Putin of Russia, and Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan. Uzbekistan joined the community on 7 October 
2005, however later withdrew on 16 October 2008 (Boris N. Mamlyuk, 2014). 
8 It is interesting that in integration literature one can find very rarely about Soviet Union integration, mainly 
in some through books like “Regional Integration and Development” by Schiff and Winters (2003), where they 
discussed history of Regional Integration Agreements with example of the customs union of the province of 
France 1664 or Germany (the Zollverein), but concerning the great Soviet integration, nothing.  
9 In 1991, twelve former Soviet Union republics excluding the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) 
signed the agreement on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). CIS members are the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, the Republic of 
Turkmenistan, the Republic of Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The present analysis also includes Georgia that ceased 
its membership in 2009 and Ukraine that ceased its membership in 2014 (Executive Committee of CIS, “About 
the Commonwealth of Independent States”), http://www.cis.minsk.by/page.php?id=174 [10‐03‐2015]. 
10 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the seven 
poorest CIS countries (IMF, 2004) 
11 The five Central Asian countries are the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, the Republic 










resources and raw materials, rather than promoting manufacturing goods’ exports. Most of 
CIS countries under-rely on other CIS countries for their imports of manufactured goods but 
over-rely on them as a destination for their manufactured exports (Eurasian Development 
Bank, 2012), what entails to a certain extent difficulty in reaching the minimum required 
level of international competitiveness. Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash (1998) stated that the 
increase of trade openness at the initial stage of transition process amongst the former Soviet 
Union countries provided more benefits for those countries closer to the European Union 
(EU). Later, Emerson et al. (2006) analyzed the effect of the bilateral Foreign Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between EU and Ukraine on trade performance concluding that the overall 
welfare gain for Ukraine from a deep FTA with the EU would be above 10%. Moreover, 
these authors estimated that this gain would be induced by new trade flows accounting for 
4-7% whereas the reduction in the cost of capital could lead to an additional 4-5% welfare 
gain. Maliszewska (2008) concluded that a deep FTA with the EU is expected to bring a 
welfare gain of 3.38 per cent for the Armenian GDP and a 6.5 per cent gain for the Georgian 
GDP. Moreover, they have concluded that due to the FTA with the EU Georgian exports are 
expected to increase by 13.5% in five years.  
Since the creation the CIS in 1991 several bilateral agreements have been signed 
concerning trade, investments as well as other elements of economic cooperation. 
Nevertheless, a far-reaching integration process among CIS countries has not really been 
achieved yet. In consequence, new attempts to either deepen or improve the already signed 
trade liberalization agreements will be applied in the future in order to at least try to find 
some kind of economic as well as financial mutual benefits in the region.  
It is obvious that most Central Asian countries, particularly Tajikistan, seek to build 
bilateral relations with foreign policy players in accordance with their national interests and 
foreign policy priorities, pursuing a “multi-vector” policy, focusing on cooperation with as 
many external partners as possible. Along with different integration initiatives followed by 
Tajikistan, a special mention should be given to the integration with outsiders of the post-
Soviet area, mainly China and Southern neighbours, which are considered the agents that 
changed dramatically the geopolitical and economic position of Central Asian countries. In 
fact, China has quickly become a key player in the regional scene with its prominent 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From this point of view, nowadays, the Central 
Asian region is recognized as the driving force ensuring the so called “peaceful rise of 









religion and given the geostrategic position of the country, Tajikistan is trying to strengthen 
its status in the Islamic world. Hence, the participation of the country into a number of key 
institutions whose membership is based on the full or partial identification with Islam, like 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO) is not excluded. From this stance, integration with countries outside the post-Soviet 
space, such as China and its Southern neighbors is considered as a third option within the 
scope of its integration strategy. 
However, as it will be explained in the following sections of the thesis dissertation, the 
link between trade growth and economic development both among emerging and OECD 
countries is not free from academic controversy. Therefore, a deep literature survey 
regarding this academic issue must be carried out before starting with the empirical analysis 
of different aspects related to the recent economic behavior amongst CIS countries. In the 
following sections, we summarize the main objectives of the pieces of research included in 
the three sections corresponding to this thesis dissertation. Countries began to remove 
constraints on the movement of goods, services and capital with an increasing globalization 
after the Second World War. In the last three decades’ economists and policy makers have 
agreed when considering that good institutions are the key factor aimed at enhancing 
economic growth. 
Since the early 1980s, when many developing countries were experiencing severe 
economic difficulties because of excessive market regulation and trade protection, a number 
of them have initiated extensive policy reforms. These reforms have been designed to free 
up markets and to move these countries in a more outward-oriented direction (Stryker and 
Pandolfi, 1997). 
“It is now widely accepted that growth prospects for developing countries are greatly 
enhanced through an outer-oriented trade regime and fairly uniform incentives (primarily 
through the exchange rate) for production across exporting and import-competing goods… 
Policy reform efforts removing protection and shifting to an outward-oriented trade strategy 
are under way in a number of countries. It is generally believed that import substitution at a 
minimum outlived its usefulness and that liberalization of trade and payments is crucial for 
both industrialization and economic development…while there are still some disagreements 
over particular aspects of trade policy both among academic researchers and policy makers, 
the current consensus represents a distinct advance over the old one, in terms both of 









Economic freedom may be accepted as a quality indicator of institutions and the legal 
structure that countries have. Institutional and legal structure become very important both 
for creating an investment environment and additionally for attracting foreign investment 
and capital in a globalized world. Discussions on economic freedom go back to Adam Smith, 
but the concept of economic freedom has different meanings depending on various economic 
theories and approaches. Trade and financial liberalization contributed to increasing world 
trade volume and cross-border capital flows. World trade volume, as a percentage of GDP, 
increased from 25.62% in 1960 to about 60% in 2013 (World Bank, 2015a). Furthermore, 
cross-border capital flows increased to about 20% of the world GDP in 2007, but then 
decreased to 5% of the world GDP in 2012 (James et al., 2014). 
Transaction costs arise fundamentally due to opportunistic behaviors in the market and 
because of uncertainty in the general economic environment. Hence, security of property 
rights and enforcement of private contracts are central objectives in a sound framework of 
formal institutions (North, 1990). But a good government also requires sound and neutral 
economic policies, which demand independence and autonomy for government structures. 
Bad polices induce macroeconomic instability. Hence, the present thesis argues that setting 
a free trade agreement and improving the level of infrastructure might not be seen as panacea 
for agreement and improving the level of infrastructure might not be seen as panacea for 
development if we do not consider the quality level corresponding to institutions in the 
country. 
The role of institutions in the economy has received significant attention from 
researchers in recent years. In order to better understand the mechanism by which institutions 
matter for socio-economic outcomes, some researchers focused on aspects of institutions and 
economic outcomes. For example, Eichengreen and Iversen (1999) and Nickell and Layard 
(1999) focused on labour market institutions and economic performance. Banerjee and Iyer 
(2005) focused on historical land tenure system and its effect on economic performance in 
rural India; Acemoglu et al. (2005b) distinguish into “property rights institutions" and 
“contracting institutions" and explore their effect on various measures of economic 
performance.  
In a recent paper, Javorcik and Wei (2000) suggests that the effect of good governance 
on transaction costs may be higher for international trade than for domestic exchange. On 
the one hand, trade often requires investing in long-term business relations; on the other, 









completeness and higher uncertainty, explained by the incidence of multiple governance 
systems in international markets, the impact of institutions on cross-border trade is more 
pronounced. 
Much of the existing (economics) literature has tended to treat Central Asian countries 
as a relatively homogenous region. However, after more than two decades of independence, 
important differences are emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio over 
the period 1995–2011 is much higher for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% on average) than 
for Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (26% in average). This ranking coincides with 
the one published by the World Bank (2013), the ‘‘Doing Business’’ report, which reflects 
the ease of doing business, tax collection, investor protection, access to credit, trading across 
borders, corruption, economic freedom, and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49th out of 183 
countries) is the highest ranking among Central Asian countries, followed by Kyrgyzstan 
(70), Tajikistan (141), and Uzbekistan (154) while Turkmenistan is not ranked at all. This 
outcome perhaps illustrates the close ties between trade openness and overall economic 
reforms.  
 
1.3.  Statement of the research subject and objectives of investigation 
 
Our main research in the rest lies on an assessment of CIS’s economic integration 
process including the international milieu and context where it has been formed, the 
influence of economic integration in each CIS country and their prospects of development 
in the near future. We shed light on the migration remittances flows among CIS countries. 
In achieving this main objective, we put forward several specific objectives. The role of 
Official Development Assistance on both growth and poverty reduction is also examined, in 
this particular case utilizing the Republic of Tajikistan as the case study to be analyzed. 
Firstly, regarding the research on the trade flows trends among CIS countries, we must 
acknowledge that the Post-Soviet states economies are the best case study to deepen the 
knowledge about the recent access of transition countries to the world economy.  
The modern development of international relations is characterized by a sharp 
acceleration of the process of forming regional integration associations. This is due to the 









cooperation, as well as helps to find common points of contact between nation states to 
address common issues and problems (Grinberg, 2001). At the same time, the development 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States is characterized by both centripetal and 
centrifugal tendencies. Despite the fact that the CIS countries are connected by many ties, 
such as geographical proximity, the unity of economic linkages, infrastructure, a common 
historical past, nevertheless, the integration process ran into great difficulties. Therefore, it 
becomes necessary to identify the main patterns of the integration process and the 
contradictions that impede integration amongst CIS countries. The evolution of integration 
amongst CIS countries is strengthening, but it has surged from the creation of too fragile 
systems (Frolov, 2013). This fragility has been provoked by both the search for national 
identity in each nation and by the transition to a market economy system. Another specific 
feature of the integration of countries is the primacy of opportunistic political decisions in 
it. 
The main goal of integration amongst CIS countries so far has been based on 
promoting regional trade and investments through liberalization. It derives from the idea that 
trade has a great potential for poverty reduction and hence it should be facilitated and 
promoted. 
This specific objective’s accomplishment requires reviewing the literature on 
economic integration, including the contribution to growth and poverty reduction of both 
migrant remittances as well as official development assistance. We put special emphasis on 
the effect for less developed countries, with the purpose of understanding the strengths and 
weaknesses of the traditional and the new theory of economic integration. 
          In an attempt to understand the rationality of the integration decision of CIS countries 
in terms of the effect of potential integration on welfare, the second specific objective is to 
improve significantly the acknowledgement of the different integration options followed by 
CIS countries. Trying to assess the role of economic integration and regarding that the main 
motivation is obtaining an economic interpretation for the integration strategies among 
developing counties, we carry out an assessment on the welfare impact of some features of 
economic integration. The analysis of the effects of both migrant remittances and official 
development assistance, as the main integration determinants amongst CIS countries, allows 
carrying out a dynamic look at the past evolution of these states’ economies.  









through testing the different hypotheses put forward. In the section 3.1. of this Thesis 
Dissertation, we reveal that belonging to the same free trade agreement has provoked an 
increase in Central Asian countries trade flows considering the level of institutional quality 
and geographical disadvantage amongst CIS countries. We found that the CIS countries 
could give the largest boost to their exports by improving their governance quality, 
especially in the areas of government effectiveness, openness, trade liberalization, 
regulation, level of corruption and the level of democracy.  
World Trade Organization (2005) report stated that greater openness and trade 
liberalization not only promote a country’s exports and imports, but also stimulate private 
sector economic activities, attract foreign investment, reduce poverty rates, create 
employment and increase foreign earnings. However, Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash (1998) 
examined the case of CIS countries and concluded that some CIS countries are becoming as 
open as similar market economies, but many others remain relatively closed. More precisely, 
Woytek (2003) claimed that after the collapse of the USSR CIS countries changed less than 
other transition economies due to geographical obstacles, restrictions on trade, governance 
and corruption problems, weak infrastructure, lack of regional cooperation and political 
conflicts amongst these countries.  
The next hypothesis we set in the section 3.1.  is related to the link between 
landlockedness and trade growth amongst CIS countries. It is obvious that seven of twelve 
CIS countries are landlocked, and even four of them are double-landlocked countries which 
means that these double-landlocked countries are surrounded only by landlocked countries 
so that they have to cross at least two national borders to reach a coastline. We found that 
geographical disadvantage and poor infrastructure have considerable negative effects on 
trade growth amongst CIS countries. Despite the fact that the mentioned bilateral trade 
arrangements within the CIS are far from being efficient and need improvement, our findings 
suggest that CIS countries should improve their governance quality and infrastructure to 
boost trade.  
After the collapse of the USSR, regional integration has become a strategic goal in 
Russia’s foreign policy and although the geographical destination of CIS countries’ exports 
of natural resources and raw materials have diversified, Russia still effectively remains the 
pivot of post-Soviet economic relations in CIS region.  From Moscow’s point of view, 









expansion of the European Union and China, as well as to tighten the relationship between 
the CIS countries and Russia (Wisniewska, 2013). 
The hypotheses we put forward on the section 3.2.  of this Thesis Dissertation discuss 
the positive association between remittances and a higher standard of living (higher per 
capita GDP) as well as the negative link between remittances and the level of poverty in the 
CIS region. Although experts’ evidence on the effect of remittances is ambiguous, we found 
remittances seem to have produced a significant reduction on poverty through increasing 
income and smoothing consumption levels among CIS nations. 
According to the World Bank (2016) four of CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Moldova 
Tajikistan, and Ukraine) are listed among the world top ten remittances receiving countries 
regarding the ratio of remittances to GDP, whereas one of them (Ukraine) is listed among 
the ten top recipients of remittances according to the ratio of volume of remittances (in 
billion USD). Long before the Russian economic crisis, triggered by the Western economic 
sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine Crisis in mid-2014, the labour migrants provided 
approximately 49.6% of Tajikistan’s GDP, 38.1% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, 26.9% of 
Moldova’s GDP and 16% of Uzbekistan’s GDP (World Bank, 2015). Brownbridge and 
Canagarajah (2010) claim that the reduction of remittances provokes a drop in imports of 
consumer goods, whilst households still have to hold other high levels of consumption (for 
instance paying housing rents) and investment in housing. In this section, we found that the 
long-term or short short-term effect of remittances to CIS countries depends either on the 
extent to which households use them productively or on institutional quality levels. We show 
that a positive effect of remittances on the economic growth and poverty reduction is related 
to a rise in investment in children’s education, to a rise in population disposable income and 
to the trend towards consumption smoothing among CIS countries. However, experts affirm 
that remittances can ease the pressure on governments to carry out structural reforms in order 
to reduce the external imbalance. Remittances can also reduce the local labour effort as well 
as increase the level of moral hazard and brain drain amongst recipient countries. 
Nevertheless, we did not find the above-mentioned negative effects of remittances in the 
case of CIS countries. According to Olters (2019) brain drain is a symptom, not a cause of 
an underperforming economy following the case of Central Asian countries.  
Although, section 3.2. empirically claims that remittances do positively affect 
economic growth and do negatively affect poverty amongst CIS countries, we should not 









countries should seek to break the cycle of remittance dependency by ensuring good welfare 
coverage and a secure investment climate. The promotion of remittances should only be one 
part of any country’s development strategy. CIS countries ought to attempt to use a more 
rational way of investing remittance inflows in dynamic productive sectors such as 
education, physical and human capital formation or small and medium businesses. 
The third section (section 3.3.) of this Thesis dissertation analyses the effect of official 
development assistance (ODA) on economic growth and poverty reduction in the case of the 
Tajik economy and, as well, compares the ODA role recently played by emerging countries 
including Russia, the so-called South-South Cooperation, with the one played by Western 
countries.  
We attempt to assess the effect of ODA on economic growth and poverty reduction in 
Tajikistan with the purpose of testing the hypotheses put forward. Our hypotheses sustain 
that the volume of foreign aid is associated with a higher standard of living (higher per capita 
GDP) and poverty reduction considering the most appropriate institutional policies in ODA 
recipient countries. As expected, our findings reveal that there is a positive relationship 
between ODA and economic growth and a negative effect of ODA on poverty levels, once 
considered the institutional environment in Tajikistan. Furthermore, our findings suggest 
that OECD countries and China are still the main providers for the multilateral and bilateral 
aid channels to Tajikistan, whereas Chinese role is the most relevant in this regard. 
To synthesize and summarize these results, we have not been able to avoid studying 
the effect of the Russian economic behavior on CIS economic development. We have tried 
to test whether Russia’s economic policy is still having a significant impact on CIS economic 
development and whether the bilateral economic relationship between Russia and CIS 
countries is still greater than might be expected. We have discovered that CIS countries’ 
trade growth has been associated with Russian economic performance, especially through 
migrant remittances and financial flows. However, as shown in the section 3.3., the role 
played by Russia in providing development assistance funds to Tajikistan remains 
insignificant in this regard.  
Given the challenges faced by CIS Governments, they need to be held responsible for 
the accountability of regional integration, remittances inflows as well as ODA utilization. 
These accountability levels must be properly managed to favour economic growth and 
improve social sectors, with the purpose of reorienting these financial inflows to optimize 









1.4.  Methodological approach 
As suggested above, the purpose of this research has consisted of analysing the 
determinants of several economic variables whose behaviour can be considered relevant for 
post-Soviet countries development prospects. Among these variables, we have given prior 
importance to trade flows figures, the level of economic development measured with the per 
capita GDP or the evolution of different estimates of poverty. When making reference to the 
main determinants of development, we have chosen several explanatory variables upon 
which this region’s welfare will depend, such as alternative measures of institutional quality, 
remittances inflows, trade openness or Official Development Assistance figures. 
With the purpose of testing hypotheses of the section 3.1., we have employed the basic 
model suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The gravity equation provides a 
general empirical framework suited to the examination of issues related to the behaviour of 
bilateral trade flows over the time. This model allows us to identify the impact on bilateral 
trade of variables such as infrastructure, landlockedness, institutions, free trade agreements, 
or the Russian economic performance once all other structural determinants of trade, mainly 
GDP, contiguity and others are controlled for. This model has been widely and consistently 
used and has proved to be empirically successful in terms of significance and robustness of 
its explanatory variables in explaining different sorts of economic flows amongst countries, 
such as commerce, investment or population flows (migration ones). With regard to the 
specific econometric procedure to be utilized, we applied a fixed effects (FE) model, which 
assumes constant but not equal individual country effects, which leads to the use of the so-
called fixed effect model. The second method is the random effects (RE) model, and the 
assumption is a situation where country effects are not constant, but are treated such as 
disturbances. We estimated our model employing a panel data set of bilateral export flows 
between Russia and each of the 11 CIS countries. The time span for the analysis is 17 years 
from 1997 to 2014, due to the limited data availability. We test the importance of the trade 
regime (Free Trade Association Regime between the two countries partners). Under the 
research process, we found that the creation of a FTA has positively influenced trade flows 
amongst CIS countries, mainly because a FTA allows CIS countries to reduce the relevance 
of transit costs. High transport costs are certainly one of the main impediments to the 
reorientation of CIS trade flows. This happens as a consequence of the fact that overland 
distances are more penalizing than sea distances: as a result of their higher costs per mile 









transit countries for their trade. Furthermore, our findings suggest that Russian economic 
performance is positively related to bilateral trade flows, so we can state that Russia’s 
economy’s health (proxied with the inclusion of Russian Income and Russian Current 
Account surplus) positively affects bilateral trade flows. 
Trade cooperation represents an important element of relations between the Russian 
and CIS countries. The specificity and significance of this sector results from three different 
reasons. Firstly, Russia and CIS countries are each other’s important, even if not the very 
top of the list, trade partners. Secondly, trade affairs were on numerous occasions the essence 
of the disputes between Russia and CIS countries, even if their background was both 
economic and political. Thirdly, trade relations between both states are of vital importance 
in the context of Russia’s attempts at reunification of the post-Soviet area (CIS, CES).   
With respect to the second section (section 3.2.), remittances as a potential 
determinant of economic development, our empirical approach will contribute to two strands 
of the literature. The first strand relates to the remittances’ effect on economic growth and 
the second strand relates the remittances’ effect on poverty reduction. The model developed 
to explore the relationship between remittances and economic growth is based on the 
extended version of the neoclassical model (Barro, 1996), which has been used by Giuliano 
and Ruiz-Arranz (2005), Jongwanich (2007) and Fayissa and Nsiah (2008). Additionally, 
the second strand is the one that links remittances and poverty levels. The model to assess 
the role of remittances on poverty reduction is based on Ravallion and Chen (1997), Adams 
and Page (2005), Gupta et al. (2007) and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010). We use cross-
country data to analyse the effect of remittances on per capita GDP and poverty reduction of 
CIS countries. Section 3.2. analyses 10 selected CIS countries for the period 1998–2016. In 
comparison with the section 3.1, we have excluded two CIS countries (Russia and 
Kazakhstan) as these countries are the main destination for migrants from the CIS region, 
accumulate 88% of CIS migrants.  We test our hypotheses with the help of random-effect, 
fixed-effects, least square models (OLS), with and without instrumental variables.  
This study yields insights into two importance channels through which remittances 
both positively affect economic growth and negatively affect poverty amongst CIS countries. 
All variables included in our two equations reach the theoretically expected sign and 
statistical significance and thus confirm the hypotheses put forward. 
In terms of official development assistances ODA (section 3.3.), the main objective of 









methodology including annual data from 1998 to 2016 for the Tajik economy. It is 
worthwhile to mention that we have selected only Tajikistan amongst CIS countries. This 
choice is because Tajikistan is the one of the poorest countries among post-Soviet states and 
the best case study since this country has received a considerable amount of development 
assistance from China: the amount of ODA received by Tajikistan from China amounted to 
19.8% of Tajik GDP during the last decade. 
We followed Solow’s (1956) basic neoclassical growth model, which has been more 
recently improved and applied by Tallman and Wang (1994) and Barro and Lee (1994). In 
an effort to examine the relationship between ODA and poverty reduction, we follow the 
primary linear model approach suggested by Ravallion (1997). 
With the purpose of carrying out the above-described analysis, we utilised the Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) as well as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, we 
mostly focus on VECM results because VECM allows us to obtain jointly the long-term and 
short-term relationships between variables since this model is correctly specified and the 
following interpretation of results is simple yet intuitive. Moreover, VECM allows us to deal 
with both stationary and non-stationary variables with different orders of integration. 
Furthermore, in order to estimate the model, various analytical techniques such as Unit root 
test, Augmented-Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), ADF-GLS (generalised least 
squares) test (Fuller, 1976), KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), Granger Causality test 
(Granger, 1969), Variance Decomposition, Impulse of Response Function (Haug and Smith, 
2007), CUSUM and CUSUMQ stability test (Luger, 2001) and diagnostic tests were carried 
out. 
One of the main conclusions of this section is that official development assistance has 
played a crucial role in Tajikistan’s development and therefore it is hard to imagine a further 
development of the country without coordinated external support from the donor 
community.  
The work examined the relationship, firstly, between foreign aid and per capita GDP 
growth and, secondly, between aid and poverty reduction. Expectedly, our results confirm 
our hypotheses and reveal that there is a positive relationship between ODA and economic 
growth and a negative effect of ODA in poverty levels, once considered the institutional 
environment in Tajikistan. In order to estimate poverty levels, we measured poverty rate 








based on the methodology of Foster et al. (1984). They state that poverty will be measured 
based on three measures: headcount poverty, poverty gap (or poverty depth) and square 
poverty gap (or poverty severity). 
 
      1.5.  Tested Hypotheses 
The objective of this Thesis Dissertation has consisted of testing the following 
hypotheses:    
H1: Belonging to the same free trade agreement has provoked an increase in trade 
flows amongst CIS countries. 
H2: Each country’s particular institutions do play a role in explaining trade flows 
amongst CIS countries: countries with higher level of institutional quality experience better 
trade performance. 
H3: Geographical disadvantage (landlockedness and poor infrastructure) impact trade 
amongst CIS countries: a landlocked country’s trade figures are lower. 
H4: Russia’s economic performance has a strong impact on CIS countries’ trade flows. 
H5: Globalization has not favoured trade growth among CIS countries.  
H6: The volume of remittances is positively associated with a higher standard of living 
(higher per capita GDP). 
H7: The volume of remittances is positively associated with poverty reduction. 
H8: The volume of foreign aid is associated with a higher standard of living (higher 
per capita GDP). 
H9: Foreign aid has been able to reduce poverty levels among recipient countries. 
H10: In case South-South cooperation upsurge has already become a reality, it will 
improve the standard of living of the population of aid receiving countries. 
 
 
     1.6.  Source 
The bibliography used for writing the present Ph.D. thesis has a wide variety and it is 
based on academic, press or statistical resources. 
The references used in order to support the explanations developed throughout this 
PhD dissertation show a wide variety. Firstly, bibliographical sources are based on several 
documents written in different tongues such as English, Russian, and Tajik languages. 
Second, the thesis is held up by a large amount of statistical data provided by official 








recourses such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
Coordinated Direct Investment Survey by IMF, UNCTAD, Agency on Statistics under the 
President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Central Bank of Russia, etc. Some databases are 
available online (available online at the official websites of these organizations), whereas 
others have been collected in statistical volumes such as Migration and Remittances by 
World Bank, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, and so on.  Moreover, many articles of CIS 
scientists (who publish in Russian) were found in journals well‐ known in post‐Soviet 
academic circles such as Центральная Азия и Кавказ (Central Asia and Caucasus), Россия 
в Глобальной Политике (Russia in Global Affairs), Международная Жизнь (International 
Life), web‐sites of CIS, Russian International Affairs Council and Expert media holding, 
and thematic journals dedicated only to Eurasian integration, such as Евразийская 
Интеграция: Экономика, Право, Политика (Eurasian Integration: Economy, Law, 
Politics).  
The relevance of using local references is that a major difficulty in analyzing 
remittances within the CIS is that several of CIS countries do not provide data on the official 
international sources or if they do it is only partially. Sometimes they only cover one or two 
of the official components, or the estimates appear to be unreliable given other known 
information about the size of population flows and remittances. For instance, Belarus, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in terms of workers’ remittances components, amounts of 
official development assistance, and the level of institutional qualities are not always 
available on official resources such as World Bank or UNICTAD. In particular, these data 
are uniquely available in their own official web sources. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz Republic 
does not provide data on the compensation of employees’ components (for inflows). 
Moreover, data and reports with regard to the migration situation in Russia are just provided 
through the “Russia in Global Affairs” international platform. Therefore, the conclusions 
and recommendations also are based on the findings from the reports and surveys which are 
provided in Russian language. It also should be noted that “Eurasian Integration: Economy, 
Law, Politics” is a well-researched and detailed book, since the editors provide an extensive 
and critical analysis of post-Soviet regional integration. 
 
 
1.7.  Empirical results and discussion  
 
The present Thesis illustrates three published papers and the regression results of








each papers are annexed in the section 3 that’s “Published works accepted for publication”. 
The section 3.1 that entitled on “Factors explaining trade growth among the former 
Soviet Central Asian countries after the recent globalization process” examines the 
determinants of trade flows among CIS countries after the signature of several free trade 
agreements, in an attempt to create a trade bloc aimed at benefiting from the world 
globalization process. Furthermore, we test the extent to which CIS countries’ trade growth 
has been associated with Russian economic performance.  
Our results suggest that trade are the main channels of outward spillovers from Russia 
on CIS countries. Russian economic performance is positively related to bilateral trade 
flows, so we can state that Russia’s economy’s health (proxied with the inclusion of Russian 
Income and Russian Current Account variable) positively affects bilateral trade flows. It also 
should be noted that trade between CIS countries is favoured by the existence of a FTA 
bilateral agreement, confirming the hypotheses put forward above. Worthy to note that trade 
between CIS countries is favoured by the existence of a FTA bilateral agreement, confirming 
the hypotheses put forward above. With regard to expected result trade is positively 
associated with exporter and importer GDPs. However, the coefficients estimated for the 
exporting and importing countries do slightly differ from each other. Supply determinants 
are more significant than demand ones: coefficients for the rand effect model range from 
0.154 to 0.194, and from 0.030 to 0.032 by fixed effcet models for the exporting country. 
For the importing country, our coefficient ranges only from 0.098 to 0.114 (random effect) 
and from 0.001 to 0.0008 (fixed effect).  
In contrast, deriving from regressions, it appears that there is a negative correlation 
between landlockedness and trade. Both our random effect model procedures show negative 
results of -2.115 and -0.486 for that variable, while fixed effect models show similar negative 
results. Although in many gravity papers, the common border is found to have a positive 
correlation to trade, in our model it does not register a statistically significant result. We do 
not use distance, as it does not show statistical significance because the huge distance 
between CIS countries and major industrial areas of Russia (Moscow, Ural and Siberia). 
With regard to institutional variables, our estimates show that government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality (among importing countries) register the expected 
positive and significant sign for the RE procedure, while the absence of violence (exporting 
countries) reveal the expected positive result for both the fixed effect and the random effect 








procedures. However, the measure of the level of democracy (Voice Accountability) appears 
to be negatively correlated with export flows. 
The section 3.2. assert on “Impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty 
 reduction amongst CIS countries” which the main goal of this section is to assess the effect 
of remittances on economic growth and poverty reduction amongst the post-Soviet states, 
compared with other external sources of capital, such as foreign aid and foreign direct 
investment. In this paper we use a panel data set on economic growth and poverty estimates 
(poverty headcount, poverty gap and poverty severity) in 10 selected former post-Soviet 
republics i.e. Commonwealth of Independent States.  
The result of regression analysis asset on two equations. The first equation (Equation 
1) is estimated using OLS, Fixed-Effects Model and Random Effects Model.  The result of 
the Equation 1 reveal that the relationship between the GDP per capita and the explanatory 
variables, representing the sources of growth, show the expected signs, according to our prior 
prediction. The results from our model specify that the remittances variable has a positive 
and statistically significant effect at 5% and 10% on the GDP per capita. We found that, on 
an average, a 1 percentage point increase in remittances would provoke a 0.21% to 0.29% 
increase in the average per capita GDP of a CIS economy. In contracts, the negative 
coefficient associated with openness is statistically significant only in the first and second 
models at 1%. It also should be noted that a higher degree of international integration of the 
real sector makes the export of labour forces – which is a precondition for remittances – less 
attractive (Berg and Krueger, 2003). Moreover, note that other controlling variables, i.e. 
inflation, income inequality and human capital reach the theoretical expected signs although 
they are not statistically significant. In particular, Stahl (1982) argues that remittances could 
induce income inequality. 
The second equation (Equation 2) using the same model used on the first equation 
reveal that the remittances are found to have a significant impact on the poverty headcount 
and the square poverty gap. Our result reveal that, on average, an increase in remittances by 
1% leads to a reduction in poverty headcount from 0.21 to 0.24%. Furthermore, Table 5 
shows that remittances will have a slightly larger impact on poverty when this is measured 
by more sensitive poverty measures: poverty gap and squared poverty gap. It shows that on 
overage, a 1% increase in remittances will lead from 0.66 to 0.96% decline in the share of 
people living in poverty gap, although results are not statistically significant, and from 1.81 
to 1.98 % decline in the share of people living in squared poverty gap.  Moreover, the results 








reveal that, regardless of the measure of poverty used as the dependent variable, GDP per 
capita has a negative and significant coefficient (the coefficient ranges from -0.31 to -8.3). 
Other controlling variables, i.e. income inequality, openness, inflation, human capital and 
government expenditure, reach the theoretical expected signs although some of them are not 
statistically significant.  
A positive coefficient for the GINI index, although it is not statistically significant, 
points out that higher inequality leads to higher poverty. Surprisingly, our results suggest 
that inequality reduction does not play a key role in scaling down poverty levels. 
On the section 3.3. we focused on case of Tajikistan and our explorer entitled on the 
“Patterns of official development assistance in Tajikistan: effects on growth and poverty 
reduction” and the main goal of this section is to assess the effect of official development 
assistance on economic growth and poverty reduction in Tajikistan, as well as to examine 
the recent role of South-South Cooperation. We used a panel data set on economic growth 
and poverty estimates in Tajikistan and used to equations (Equation 1) which the first is asset 
on the relationship between official development assistance (ODA) and economic growth 
based on the primary linear model form suggested by Ravallion (1997).  The second equation 
(Equation 2) assert on the relationship between official development assistance and poverty 
reduction. The second equation assessed Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). As we 
noted above estimating the VECM model we used various analytical techniques, such as unit 
root test, Augmented-Dickey Fuller test, ADF-GLS (generalised least squares) test, KPSS 
test, Variance Decomposition, Impulse of Response Function, and CUSUM and CUSUMQ 
stability test). The Variables, measures and data sources, the summary of ADF, DF-GLS and 
KPSS unit root tests, and the summery of Vector Error Correction Estimates are indicated in 
tables the section 3.3., respectively.   
The result of ADF, DF-GLS and KPSS unit root tests suggest that all variables were 
confirmed to be stationary, except labour force participation (LnLF), secondary school 
enrolment (in percentage) which used as a proxy for the measure of investment in human 
capital (LnEdu), and level of inflation (LnInf), which were suggesting at 1% stationary only 
with constant and trend. The level of GDP per capita (LnGDPpc) is stationary at 1%, with 
constant and with constant and trend. The remaining variables official development 
assistance (LnODA), General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) 
(LnGE), aand the level of Transparency, accountability, and corruption (LnCPIA), level of 
openness (LnOPN), level of income equality (LnGINI), and the level of poverty (LnPov) are 








stationary at 5% and 10% with constant and with constant and trend, respectively. The result 
of VECM indicate that coefficient of GDPpc is positive (1.6865 > 0). Furthermore, the ODA 
coefficient is positive (0.62408 > 0) and statistically significant at 1%. Consequently, we can 
confirm the Hypothesis 1. Accordingly, the coefficient of public corruption (L_CPIA) 
variable is negative; however, it is not statistically significant. This indicates that the spread 
of corruption erodes the effectiveness of ODA in promoting economic growth. Corruption 
is a severe problem in Tajikistan, partly favoured by the numerous rules and regulations 
inherited from Soviet times. Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International 
(“Corruption perceptions index 2017.” 2018) reports that Tajikistan scored 21 points out of 
100 on the 2017 report. The coefficient of fiscal policy variable (L_GovExp) is significant, 
at a 5% level. This indicates that the level of government expenditure is an important factor 
of economic growth. 
As expected, the coefficient of trade openness is found to be positive and significant 
at 1% level. Fenny (2005) states that openness encourages a skilled labour force to contribute 
more to growth, with the help of technology, research and development imports. Moreover, 
as was expected, the coefficient of labour force (l_LF) is found to be positive and significant, 
at a 5% level. Furthermore, the coefficient of human capital accumulation (L_Edu) is 
positive, but it is not statistically significant. 
To assess that effect of ODA on poverty level in Tajikistan we used OLS (Model 1) 
and VECM (Model 2) based on the model used by Mosley et al. (1987), Ijaiya and Ijaiya 
(2004), and McGillivray et al. (2006).  The results of the analysis confirm our expectations. 
According to the Model 1 GDP per capita has a statistically significant negative impact on 
poverty at 1% and 5% levels. As a 1% increase in GDP leads to a 0.79% e decrease in 
poverty, ODA triggers a 0.0305 reduction in poverty. As was expected, Model 2 suggests 
that ODA has a negative and statistically significant impact on poverty at 1% and 10%, thus 
confirming hypothesis forward. According to Model 2, a 1% increase in ODA and GDP per 
capita reduces poverty in 0.50% and 0.48% respectively.   
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The main research objectives of this thesis dissertation were the assessment of the integration 
process followed by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) after independence and the 
expected effects on trade relationships, as well as the impact of migrant remittances on economic 
growth and poverty reduction amongst CIS countries. Moreover, this piece or research has examined 
the impact of official development assistance on economic growth and poverty reduction in the case of 
Tajikistan.  
The conclusions of this thesis dissertation originate from the hypotheses and objectives that have 
been put forward in the introduction and in consequence are summarized in the following subheadings. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis confirm that free trade agreements have provoked 
an increase in trade flows amongst CIS countries.  
The process of disintegration of the Soviet Union affected the subsequent commercial interaction 
between its former member states. Opposed to this phenomenon, throughout the second half of the 20th 
century, the world economy accomplished a greater openness, since free trade and globalization have 
both significantly grown in depth and importance in almost every country around the world. Among 
the main trends regarding the recent development of the world economy, we can mention the increasing 
interdependence of the countries that share an almost simultaneous development of integration 
processes, together with the intensive transition of countries from closed national economies into open 
internationalized ones.  
After the collapse of the USSR, the countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) took urgent measures to minimize the adverse consequences of the fragmentation of the 
former Soviet economy. From the beginning of this process and after the formation of the CIS, taking 
part in multilateral and bilateral international treaties was considered as a condition for future 
development, in order to profit from economic integration as a new advantage for every country's 
development. Nevertheless, certain major obstacles and disagreements continue to exist with regard to 
integration projects. Our findings suggest that a closer regional integration among CIS countries could 
boost bilateral trade flows’ growth, mainly because FTAs allow CIS countries to decrease the size of 
transit costs. 
 
Improvements in institutional quality have had an important role in stimulating economic 
growth amongst CIS countries, as countries with higher level of institutional quality experience 
a better trade performance. 
Recently, debates inside the academic literature focus on the role of institutional quality 









argue that good governance and well-managed institutions are the key element in explaining higher 
development outcomes, whereas weak governance and poor institutions can slow down economic 
growth. “Institutions are rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1991:3). 
The national economies belonging to the USSR were much more integrated before the 1990s; 
therefore, the collapse of the single Soviet economic space had a stronger negative impact on CIS 
members’ economies. Although CIS counties have made noticeable progress implementing reforms 
over these recent years, additional attempts aimed at bolstering government effectiveness, regulation 
and removing violence, as well as enhancing the level of democracy would promote foreign trade. 
However, always according to our analysis results, voice accountability does not seem to favour trade 
growth. The improvement of governance quality among the CIS countries is a challenging process that 
could take some time; however, it is definitely a job worth accomplishing. An improvement of the 
institutional bases of economic organization would be the best strategy for CIS counties. Nevertheless, 
poor control over the implementation of its decisions, alongside with the unwillingness of a number of 
them for further integration, have caused that the role of the Commonwealth in promoting growth and 
stability in the region has not reached its full potential.  
 
Geographic disadvantage i.e. landlockedness together with poor infrastructure 
lead to trade reduction amongst CIS countries. 
Although landlocked Western European countries have historically taken advantage of their 
central location, however, Classical and Neoclassical theory of development state that landlocked 
countries should register lower rates of growth than the others. According to Adam Smith (The Wealth 
of Nations), in addition to having a free market economy, there are also other factors such as 
geographical location and access to the sea that have a direct effect on each country's economic activity. 
Throughout the time, rail and air transport, as well as telecommunications and information technology, 
have reduced the advantages of coastal countries compared to landlocked countries. However, 
maritime transport continues to play a central role in world trade, and consequently geographical 
location is relevant in this regard. 
Approximately one-fifth of the world’s countries (44 countries) are landlocked, from which 
seven of them belong to the CIS region (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and even four of them (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) 
are “double landlocked”12, whereas Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a coastline on only the 
                                                 
12 Double-landlocked when it is surrounded only by landlocked countries requiring the crossing of at 









saltwater Caspian Sea.  According to Kulipanova (2012) landlockedness has considerable negative 
effects on CIS trade growth. 
Our empirical analyses suggest that geographical disadvantage negatively affects CIS trade 
flows and that there is a negative relationship between high transport costs and trade flows among CIS 
countries. We found that overland distances are more penalizing than sea distances due to their higher 
cost per mile and CIS landlocked countries particularly Central Asian double landlocked countries are 
dependent on sovereign transit countries for their trade. Moreover, our findings reveal that the 
transportation costs amongst CIS countries have a negative impact, not just on transportation budgets, 
but also on broader supply chain and financial performance.  
 
There is a strong relationship between Russia’s economic performance and CIS 
countries’ trade flows.  
The hypothesis stating that Russia’s economic performance still maintains a strong impact on 
economic growth and development in the rest of the CIS countries through trade, finance and migrant 
remittances has been empirically confirmed. Although there is a shrinking trade relationship between 
Russia and some Caucasian countries such as Ukraine, Russian growth shocks are linked with 
remarkable effects on Belarus and Kazakhstan economies, due to persistent linkages such as migrant 
remittances, finance and energy supply dependency. Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
also show a remarkable dependence on Russian economic behaviour. Furthermore, economic 
pressures, energy dependency, multilateral groupings, diasporas and the reapplication of Russian 
cultural education are all used to sustain the old, but recently revived, fantasy of the Eurasian Economic 
Union by the initiative of Russia. Regaining political control over the post-Soviet space through the 
Eurasian Economic Union and exerting its political influence to obstruct the full integration of CIS 
countries in the world market by employing those different strategies is one of the main targets of 
Russia in this regard. In consequence, those experts who have foreseen that a country’s trade with their 
colonizer typically falls by a specific percentage after 30 years of independence, or predicted that Russia 
influence would quickly vanish among CIS countries after the collapse Soviet Union, were mistaken. 
 
The volume of remittances is positively associated with a higher standard of living (higher 
per capita GDP). 
Remittances inflows continue to play a crucial role on economic growth and poverty reduction 
in the global economy. Amongst developing countries, remittances have to be considered as the most 
stable type of financial foreign currency inflow. It also should be mentioned that, although remittances 









development. World Bank (2016) reports that three of the CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Moldova) are listed amongst the world top ten remittances’ receiving countries, according to the ratio 
of remittances to GDP.  
Regarding the literature about the effect of remittances on economic development, we find that 
experts’ evidence on the issue is ambiguous. A large number of authors have proved the positive effects 
of remittances; hence, our hypothesis would be empirically confirmed. The long- or short-term effect 
of remittances depends on the extent to which households use them productively. We perceive that 
both skilled and unskilled migration play a crucial role in the economy, in spite of having a different 
opportunity cost for both origin and destination countries.  
Based on the empirical results we found that higher remittances inflows lead to a higher number 
of CIS workers to migrate abroad as they enjoy better wage-earning opportunities in labour-receiving 
countries, and therefore, this may have detrimental effects, such as less government spending on 
welfare, fewer or no institutional reforms, moral hazard and/or brain drain. Governments in CIS 
remittance-receiving countries should seek to break the cycle of remittance dependency by ensuring 
good welfare coverage and a secure investment climate. The promotion of remittances should be only 
one part of any country’s development strategy. We found that CIS countries ought to attempt to use a 
more rational way of investing remittance inflows in dynamic productive sectors such as education, 
physical and human capital formation or small and medium businesses. 
 
China is starting to play a very important role in providing a new pattern of ODA to 
Tajikistan since Chinese development assistance has proved to be more effective than 
OECD/DAC aid in this regard.  
Although developed countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to be the main source of 
international aid, the share of non-DAC contributors has been rising, especially among middle-income 
big dimension developing countries such as China, through the so-called South-South Cooperation 
channel. Our study reveals that there are some reasons why Chinese development assistance has proved 
to be more effective than OECD/DAC aid, mostly because of the lack of conditionality corresponding 
to Chinese development assistance; on the contrary, DAC donors demand structural reforms to 
recipient countries in return for aid. For instance, according to Bossuyt (2015) receptiveness to EU’s 
aid is low, mostly because it involves political conditionality and interference in domestic affairs. Our 
findings suggest that OECD countries remain the main providers of multilateral aid to Tajikistan, whilst 









found that the Chinese labor policy leads to a paradox in the case of the Tajik economy, because Tajik 
workers migrate to Russia whereas Chinese workers occupy jobs in construction projects in Tajikistan. 
 
The volume of foreign aid is linked with a higher standard of living (higher per capita 
GDP) as well as with poverty reduction especially when applying the most appropriate 
institutional policies. 
Over the past half-century, the question of the effectiveness of foreign aid remains 
mixed and an unresolved issue. A number of experts argue on the potential contribution of 
aid to growth  
and poverty reduction (Dowling and Hiemenz,1983; Fayissa and El-Kaissy, 1999). On the 
one hand, a group of authors claim on the usefulness of aid. On the other, some authors argue 
that aid eases the pressure on governments to implement structural reforms, thus reducing 
the incentive to adopt good policies (Bauer, 1982; Collier, 1999; Ferroni and Kanbur, 1992). 
However, with the terms of the relationship reversed, most studies argue on the crucial role 
of governance and institutions on the relationship between ODA and economic growth and 
poverty reduction (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Ijaiya and Ijaiya, 2004; Bourguignon, 2006).  
Dollar (1999:11) states that, “By increasing financial assistance to poor countries ..., we 
could help hundreds of millions of the poorest people in the world to improve their lives, 
and the lives of their children”. 
In order to test the above mentioned hypotheses, we have assessed the effect of official 
development assistance on economic growth and poverty reduction in the case of the Tajik 
economy and, as well, compared the recent role of South-South Cooperation and Western 
countries in this regard. We selected Tajikistan among CIS countries because this country, 
as the most aid dependent country among the post-Soviet states, has received a considerable 
amount of development assistance from donor countries, particularly from China.  
Although Tajikistan has achieved a relative political stability and therefore 
macroeconomic indicators of the country have improved since the Tajik Civil War in 1992, 
the levels of poverty, external debt, and the size of the shadow economy are a continuous 
and serious concern. In spite of the poor level of institutional quality in Tajikistan, donor 
countries provide aid to Tajikistan through embassies, agencies for cooperation and 
development, banks, and other governmental agencies in multilateral and bilateral channels. 
Our findings reveal that there is a positive relationship between ODA and economic 









environment in Tajikistan. Although our empirical results suggest in general the expected 
signs, the result obtained in this study has a number of policy implications. Given the 
challenges faced by the Tajik economy, the Tajik Government needs to be responsible for 
the accountability of ODA use. Those accountability rules must be enforced and ODA 
should be channeled to favour economic growth and social sectors, with the purpose of 
reorienting ODA in order to optimize its impact on economic growth and poverty reduction 
in the country. 
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3.1 . Factors explaining trade growth among the former Soviet Central 





This paper examines the determinants of trade flows among CIS countries after the 
signature of several free trade agreements, in an attempt to create a trade bloc aimed at 
benefiting from the world globalization process. Furthermore, we test the extent to which 
CIS countries’ trade growth has been associated with Russian economic performance. Our 
findings suggest free trade agreements have favoured the creation of trade amongst CIS 
countries. However, intra-regional trade has not soared due to geographical disadvantages 
or certain lack of governance quality. Russian influence in the region appears to be declining; 
however, new linkages such as migration, remittances, finance and energy supply 
















                                                 
13 This paper has been accepted for the publication by the Editorial Board of the "Journal of 
Globalization Studies" (https://www.sociostudies.org/journal/jogs/). 
 












The Soviet Union’s collapse14 was expected to lead to a major reorientation of each 
post-Soviet republic’s trade pattern, since politically determined commercial links under 
central planning had given rise to a substantial over-trading amongst post-Soviet states 
(Grigoriou, 2007). During this process, the structures of these economies have been, at least, 
partially reoriented, away from a single centralized command economy, towards more 
decentralized, diversified economies, which respond to price signals and incentives. As a 
result, the strong interconnections that characterized these economies weakened at the 
beginning of independence, whereas links to the rest of the world strengthened, following a 
pattern of trade creation and diversion (Viner, 1950). 
The transmission mechanism linking Russia’s economic policy and performance to 
CIS growth evolved considerably during the 1990s. The gradual integration of CIS into the 
global economy changed the structure and strength of CIS economic ties with Russia. In the 
beginning, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of the trade and 
payment systems along with the cessation of fiscal transfers from Moscow led to a 
substantial decline in the output throughout the region (Robson, 2006). From that moment 
onwards, traditional Russian influence on CIS economic performance through trade appears 
to be declining, while new linkages such as migration, remittances, finance and political 
gains through CIS dependency on Russian energy supply and transit emerged. New 
commercial hubs, such as the European Union (EU) and China have become. Hence, the 
China’s interest in CIS countries might draw some conclusion which may help Russia in the 
elaboration of its new CIS policy. Russia started to embed its domination amongst post-
Soviet states, requiring a certain political alignment after giving economic benefits. For 
instance, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia started to restore its domination 
by organizing the so-called CIS or providing access to cheap oil below its market price level, 
a key factor of influence since the beginning of the 2000s, due to the rise in raw material 
prices in the world (Malashenko, 2013). 
Although the geographical destination of CIS countries’ exports of natural resources 
and raw materials has diversified, Russia remains both the largest import and export partner 
                                                 
14The Soviet Union with 15 republics ceased to exist in 1991, when the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) was established. 









for all CIS countries. Economic pressure, energy dependency, multilateral groupings, 
diasporas and the reapplication of Russian cultural education are all used to sustain the old, 
but recently revived, fantasy of the Eurasian Economic Union15 (EEU) (Nixey, 2012). 
Regaining political control over the post-Soviet space through the EEU is one of the main 
targets of Russia in the present moment. Russia could be exerting its political influence to 
obstruct the full integration of CIS countries in the world market by employing those 
different strategies. Regarding some CIS countries, we can mention the loss of sovereignty 
of Kazakhstan and Belarus after joining the EEU, which hinders their capability of 
independently managing their internal and external affairs (Falhyakhov, 2013). Other CIS 
countries such as Tajikistan, Moldova and Uzbekistan also desire to avoid being dependent 
on one state (Galstyan, 2017). Nevertheless, these three countries feel that joining the EEU 
is inevitable, since millions of Tajik, Uzbek and Moldavian migrants are working in Russia 
and in the case of reluctance towards the EEU, Russia could exert its political influence to 
hinder these countries’ economic development (Sebastian, 1998; Europe and Central Asia 
Report #240, 2016). However, despite Russian political pressure and the poor level of 
institutional quality, which probably reduces their potential growth (Havrylyshyn et al., 
1998; EBRD, 2003; Freinkman et al., 2004), new initiatives for regional cooperation indicate 
that CIS countries are aware of trade integration potential benefits (Elvira and Vankurov, 
2011). Promoting trade flows amongst CIS countries Promoting trade flow should be a 
policy priority of each CIS member and international institutions. 
However, intra-regional trade growth has found some obstacles, as the relative 
stagnation of these flows suggest, even after the signature of the different attempts to create 
a trade bloc among the former Soviet Central Asian countries. 
The examination of the CIS countries’ existing regional trade links, in order to shed 
light on both the determinants of CIS bilateral trade flows and the connection between 
economic growth in Russia and 11 CIS countries, is the main objective of this paper. 
The gravity model was employed to estimate the trade patterns of 12 CIS countries 
covering the period of 1997-2014, including factors such as quality of countries’ institutions, 
geographic disadvantages (landlockedness16), and the restrictiveness of the trade regime 
apart from a set of control variables. This study utilized an empirical model that is similar to 
                                                 
15 EEU or EAEU members are: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia  
16 According to the geographical definition, a landlocked country is one that does not have open access to the 
sea (Roballand, 2003).  









the one by Woytek (2003), Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash (1998), Freinkman et al. (2004), 
Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004). Our empirical analysis has been carried out in order to test 
the following hypotheses: 
H1: Belonging to the same free trade agreement has provoked an increase in trade 
flows amongst CIS countries. 
H2: Each country’s particular institutions do play a role in explaining trade flows 
amongst CIS countries: countries with higher level of institutional quality experience better 
trade performance. 
H3: Geographic disadvantage (weak infrastructure, border crossing difficulties) has a 
negative impact on trade flow amongst CIS countries.  
H4: Russia’s economic performance has a strong impact on CIS countries’ trade flows. 
H5: Globalization has not favoured trade growth among CIS countries.  
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide a survey of the literature 
concerning trade flows amongst CIS countries. Section 3 describes some problems regarding 
the economic integration of Soviet Central Asian countries and Russia in the context of 
globalization. Section 4 describes the basic economic features of CIS countries. Section 5 
presents inter-regional trade performance amongst CIS countries, whereas Section 6 shows 
the methodology of the paper. Our econometric model and empirical results are explained 




2. Literature review on factors for trade growth and development  
Gains from trade are amongst the earliest and most enticing discussions in economics. 
No country in recent decades has achieved economic success, in terms of substantial increase 
in living standards for its people, without being open to the rest of the world (IMF, 2001). In 
the 1990s, the Washington Consensus, based on the recommendation of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), regarded trade openness as essential for 
achieving a high level of economic growth (Washington Consensus, 1990). According to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (2008), openness and trade liberalization not only 









promote a country’s exports and imports, but also stimulate private sector economic 
activities, attract foreign investment, reduce poverty rates, create employment and increase 
foreign earnings. 
In spite of the wave of liberalization undertaken during the last three decades, the 
debate on the links and causality between trade openness and economic growth or income 
distribution is still an open issue (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). Utilizing different 
econometric techniques, many authors have attempted to determine whether increased 
openness leads to an economic expansion. Most empirical works dealing with openness and 
growth claim to find a positive association between economic integration and growth. For 
instance, Dollar and Kraay (1992) stated that open economies grew remarkably faster 
compared to closed economies during the period 1976-1985.  
Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that open developing and developed countries grew 
annually at 4.49% and 2.29% rates respectively, whereas closed economies grew at 0.69% 
and 0.74%. Edwards (1998), performing a survey of empirical literature, defended the 
positive effect of openness on economic growth and claimed that the trade-growth nexus 
was not only robust to the indicators of openness but also to functional forms, estimation 
techniques and periods. Jeffrey (2000) employed a panel data for 65 countries covering the 
period from 1985 to 1997 and concluded that a 1% increase in trade-GDP ratio could raise 
per-capita income by at least 0.5%.17 
However, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) questioned the robustness of the studies 
proving the trade-growth positive relationship. They mainly criticized the inappropriate 
econometric techniques and the lack of control of other important determinants, an idea also 
supported by Baldwin (2003).  
Additionally, Rodrik and Rodriguez (2000) stated that this controversy is not about the 
positive or negative relationship between trade and growth, but that it is rather about the 
proper use of empirical procedures, as well as about their interpretation.  
Last but not least, Hallak and Levinsohn (2004) stated that the regression framework 
is too simple to capture the relationship between trade policy and economic growth. 
Vamvakidis (2002), using cross-section data for developed and developing countries over 
                                                 
17 The positive relation between trade and growth was also found in, among others, Mckinnon (1973), Shaw 
(1973), Dollar (1992), Warner (1995), Levine (1997), Edwards (1998), Frankel and Rommer (1999), Jin 
(2000), Wacziarg (2001), Greenaway et al. (2002), Krueger and Berg (2003), Winter (2004) and Babula and 
Anderson (2008). 
 









the period 1920-1990, revealed that there was no positive relationship between openness to 
international trade and economic growth before 1970. 
Notwithstanding, free trade supporters dismissed Rodrik and Rodriguez’s critiques. 
For instance, Panagariya (2004), after having analyzed Rodrik and Rodriguez’ view, asserted 
that their criticism is inconclusive. They concluded that the evidence from cross-country 
growth regressions is not that weak and therefore, outward-oriented policies cannot be 
rejected. Later Tung (2010), using panel data for 71 developing countries (1980-1990), 
concluded that there is a positive correlation between openness and economic growth, while 
Mendez (2010) found a conditional relationship between trade and economic growth.  
Although there is an abundant body of literature regarding the openness-trade nexus 
in many world regions, CIS countries’ case studies are scarce. Amongst them, Havrylyshyn 
and Al-Atrash (1998) stated that several  CIS countries18 are becoming as open as similar 
market economies, but many others remain relatively closed. The closest nations19 to the EU 
are the most successful. Freinkman et al. (2004) concluded that the process of trade 
diversification in CIS-720 countries remains incomplete, especially amongst low-income CIS 
countries. However, according to Woytek (2003) openness has been falling since 1997 in 
CIS countries and will likely increase if market reforms are carried out more ambitiously. 
He analyzed developments in the structure of trade in the CIS countries during 1993-2002, 
concluding that during those years, CIS changed less than other transition economies 
because of geographical aspects, restrictions on trade, governance and corruption problems, 
weak infrastructure, lack of regional cooperation and political conflicts amongst CIS 
countries. Similarly, Djankov and Freund (2000) explained home bias with Russia, through 
the introduction of high external tariffs and past links, such as infrastructure, business 
networks and production chains. Recently, Kukharchuk (2010) used cross-section data for a 
period spanning 1970-2004 finding that if CIS countries accessed jointly the WTO, their 
total trade volume would increase by 50%. 
Whether a country should adopt a free-trade regime with neighbouring countries or 
not is still a highly debated issue amongst experts. Grossman and Helpman (1991) and 
Feenstra (1995) developed international trade theories from Ricardo’s comparative 
advantage model to the two-country endogenous growth models can be considered a 
                                                 
18 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 
19 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
20 CIS-7 countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  









justification for the formation of free trade agreement (FTA).  For instance, Tinbergen (1962) 
as the pioneer econometric study using the gravity equation for international trade flow 
evaluating the effect of FTA dummy variables found economically insignificant ‘average 
treatment effects’ of FTAs on trade growth. Similarly, Bergstrand (1985) and Frankel (1995) 
found an insignificant effect of the FTA on trade amongst European Community (EC) 
member countries, opposite to Aitken (1973), Abrams (1980) and Mendez (1985), who 
found a statistically significant effect on trade flows amongst EC members. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007), using panel data for 96 countries over 1960-2000, found that, on average, 
an FTA approximately doubles two members’ bilateral trade flows after 10 years.  
Regarding FTA effect on output and trade growth amongst CIS countries, Francois 
and Manchin (2009) stated that a thorough FTA with the EU would not only reduce tariffs 
but also lead to an average 0.62% increase in CIS countries’ real income. Emerson et al, 
(2006) analyzed the FTA effect on EU and Ukraine trade performance and argued that the 
overall welfare gain for Ukraine from the FTA with the EU would be above 10%. 
Maliszewska (2008) stated that an FTA with the EU is expected to bring an increase of 
3.38% in Armenian GDP and 6.5% of the Georgian GDP. In addition, they concluded that 
due to an FTA with the EU, Georgian exports were expected to increase by 13.5% in five 
years. De Souza (2004) and Sulamaa (2004), focusing on the Russian case, suggested that 
Russia would benefit from an FTA with the EU in case Russia improved its productivity 
through better institutions or received more inward FDI. 
Other studies have identified that good institutions are the main key in enhancing 
economic growth. Therefore, liberal trade policies also need to be complemented with 
effective institutional improvement policies to ensure a longer-term effect on growth (Lee et 
al., 1997; Rodrik D., 2000; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Woytek, 2003; Acemoglu 
and Robinson, 2006).  
North (1981) and Acemoglu (2002) define institutions as a cluster of social 
arrangements that include constitutional and social limits on politicians’ and elites’ power, 
provisions for mediating social cleavages, strong property rights enforcement, the rule of 
law, a minimum amount of equal opportunities and relatively broad-based access to 
education. Hence, some authors have revealed that a better quality of institutions could   









enhance economic growth.21 For instance, Dollar (2000) using a panel data for 57 developing 
countries (1970-1993), and Ward (2001), employing a panel data for 43 developing countries 
(1975-1990), concluded that institutional qualities such as property rights, governance, 
government size and political freedom enhance economic growth.  
The transition of post-Soviet states into market economies was a phenomenon that 
inspired rethinking the role of institutions in reform programmes and economic performance. 
Amongst other empirical studies, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(2003) reports that a low quality of economic institutions are to blame for the ‘trade gap’22 
of 60% between CIS countries and the EU. Grinsberg (2005) states that because of low 
institutional quality amongst post-Soviet states, over 1,000 official agreements have been 
passed to regulate the trade within the CIS, but only about 10% are effective. 
However, institutional quality and trade barriers are not the most relevant factors for 
trade performance amongst developing countries, since remoteness, poor road/maritime 
infrastructure and landlockedness appear to be the most important causes of trade slow 
growth.23 According to Beilock (1996), each border crossing within the post-Soviet states’ 
region implies over a 400 USD increase in per truck-load freight rates. However, we should 
take into account that 84.7% of total freight transports in Central Asian countries were 
carried out by rail during 2015 (CISTAT, 2015) and therefore it is too difficult to measure 
the high negative impact of the low infrastructure level in Central Asian trade relations. In 
contrast, Venables and Limao (2001) suggested that distance explains only 10% of the 
change in transport costs, whereas poor road infrastructure explains 40% in coastal countries 
and 60% in landlocked countries. Grigoriou (2007), using panel data for 167 countries, 
including Central Asian ones over the period 1992-2004, concluded that an improvement in 
infrastructure of Central Asian countries would raise exports by 65 per cent and imports by 
8.6 per cent. According to the UN-OHRLLS’24 (2013) report, most CIS countries reveal 
transport costs that are up to 40% higher than those of a representative coastal economy.  
                                                 
21 Grogan and Moers (1999), and Gupta et al. (2002) have concluded that high corruption levels reduce the 
volume of inward FDI. 
22 EBRD indicates that transition countries, on average, trade between 40 and 75 per cent less than the average 
non-transition country. 
23 Obviously, distance and geographical factors, in general, can explain the level of transport costs. Bilateral 
distance is, for instance, at the core of the gravity approach. Tinbergen (1962) empirically demonstrated the 
negative correlation between bilateral distance and trade flows. 
24 United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked 
Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States 









The literature has explained the link between landlockedness, transport costs, 
infrastructure and growth. For instance, Bougheas et al. (1999) and McKellar et al. (2000) 
developed the theoretical relationship between infrastructure and trade growth, whereas 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Roballand (2003), who carried out a survey on the impact of 
landlockedness on trade, provided empirical evidence.  
To summarize, we acknowledge that most studies confirm the existence of a positive 
relationship between trade and growth, but the validity of the results could be questioned 
based on robustness tests. However, the presence of econometric and measurement problems 
does not permit a thorough rejection of the observed positive link between trade openness 
and economic growth. Trade policies ought to be properly complemented with the 
improvement of institutions inside countries to optimize gains from trade. 
 There have been, however, some political obstacles for the establishment of 
institutions over the last decades. Additionally, as shown by the above-mentioned empirical 
literature, the highest priority for CIS countries lies in the improvement of their transport 
infrastructure, especially amongst landlocked countries, which would help contribute 




3. Problems of the economic integration of Central Asian countries 
in the context of globalization. 
 
During the last decades, the globalization of the world economy has developed quite 
quickly. One of the mostly widespread considerations, regarding globalization, views it as 
an irreversible process imposed upon the world by some countries and institutions. 
Furthermore, Globalization as an increasingly free flow of ideas, people, goods, services, 
and capital has led to a deeper integration of economies and societies (IMF, 2002). 
Nevertheless, globalization is also far from being uncontroversial since economic theory 
does not provide a clear answer for the effect of globalization on growth. On the one hand 
many authors claim that there is a positive relationship between globalization and economic 
development. There is, however, little evidence supporting this statement. Mrak (2000) 
claims that world GDP growth rates in the 1980s and 1990s have declined since the 1970s 
when financial liberalization started to grow. Brethelot (1999) asserts that the share of 









investment over world GDP has in general fallen, suggesting a lower willingness to 
undertake long-term investments. Furthermore, Hoffmann (2002) stated that globalization 
and world trade created a global market, but it did not lead to the establishment of a global 
government or global society. Freinkman et al. (2004) analysed 25 selected CIS countries 
finding that low income economies among CIS countries have been performing on average 
just marginally better than other low-income countries and, overall, they have been falling 
behind the countries that benefit the most from globalization.  
Globalization’s effect is a highly uneven process also among the former Soviet Central 
Asian countries. After independence in 1991, the CIS countries adopted economic openness 
as the main basic strategy for economic growth. Due to difficulties in accessing global 
markets, trade amongst CIS countries has become of paramount relevance. One of the most 
important factors of economic development is foreign trade, and Central Asian economies 
should seek a higher volume intra-regional trade.  
Almost all world regions have enjoyed from the creation of regional organizations 
since the end of the Cold War; however, regional cooperation among Central Asian countries 
remains unsuccessful. As a result, Mattli (1999) argues that EU members’ intraregional trade 
reaches more than 60% of the total exports and imports flows, as the main driver for 
European integration comes from comparative advantages and economies of scale inside the 
single market. On the contrary, the share of intraregional trade within Central Asia is only 
about 10%. Intra-regional trade among the Central Asian countries has been even declining 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s.  
Figure 1 shows the trade turnover of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan drastically reduced to 
45-50% in the last two decades. Following Uzbekistan’s trade share falling to 20-25%, while 
Kazakhstan stands out as the least regionally integrated country, because its intraregional 
trade share declined up to a modest 10-15% from the 1990s until 2017 (See figure 1.1). 
There are significant barriers to trade in Central Asia regarding trade policy, 
difficulties in transport and transit systems, as well as certain lack of trade in Central Asian 
region are a complex tariff schedule and the relatively high tariffs, the Asian Development 
Bank (2010) claims that the most notable barriers in Central Asian region are a complex 
tariff schedule and the relatively high tariffs, the frequent and unpredictable changes 
 
                                                 
25 This group of countries includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan 

















   Note: Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan is not included due to the lack of reliable trade data. 
  Source: UN Comtrade database (comtrade.un.org). The Statistical Agency of Tajikistan (www.stat.tj/ru).  
 
in the tariff schedule or the high level of protectionism (i.e. high implicit tariffs in the form 
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Furthermore, EU’s large agricultural subsidies to their farmers constitute a significant barrier 
for Central Asian countries’ exports to the EU. Notably, long and unpredictable transit times 
have constrained exports of time-sensitive goods and manufactured products with relatively 
low profit margins more than exports of primary commodities, which are not time-sensitive 
and can be transported in bulk at relatively low costs (Roballand et al., 2005). Wang (2014) 
asserts that Central Asian countries have relatively similar commodity-dependent economies 
and they produce and export many of the same items and therefore need to look for trade 
partners beyond their immediate neighbours, therefore they have repeatedly deployed 
protectionist measures against each other. The literature so far explains hysteresis in former 
Soviet Union trade by remoteness and landlockedness (Hamilton and Winters, 1992; 
Djankov and Freund, 2002; Raiser and Sakatsume, 2005), distance (Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 
2003), poor access to markets and incomplete reforms (Havrylishin and Al-Atrash, 1998), 
weak institutions (Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel, 2004), or poor infrastructure (Cline 
and Cristopher, 2008).  
For instance, Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003) estimated that the former Soviet Union 
states traded 43 times more between them than predicted by GDP and distance. Raballand 
(2003), who analyzed the effect of landlockedness26 on trade in the case of Central Asian 
countries over the period 1995-1999, found that landlockedness reduces their trade by more 
than 80%. Venables and Limao (2001) and Brun et al. (2005b) highlighted the high impact 
of remoteness and poor infrastructures on trade costs. Central Asian economies are 
dependent on the export of agricultural products and a few commodities such as gas and oil 
to extra-regional markets. Moreover, they all share the fundamental infrastructure problems 
of landlocked countries at the periphery of the global market (Myant and Drahokoupil 2008). 
Kapohl and Dienes (2019) claim that Central Asian countries could improve their trade 
infrastructure and their share on the global market considerably, in case they cooperated with 
each other. 
Whereas intra-regional trade is low in Central Asia, trade dependence on external 
actors, foremost Russia but also increasingly China, is high. Russia has been the most 
important trading partner for Central Asia since the early 1990s and at least up until the 
financial crisis of 2008/9 (Jenish 2015). Russia is the main bridge between Central Asian 
                                                 
26 Only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have access to the Caspian Sea, while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan are twice landlocked countries, i.e. surrounded by countries that are themselves landlocked.  
 









countries and Europe: 70% of Central Asian exports reach Europe through Russia (Kapohl 
and Dienes, 2019). Moreover, Central Asian countries are interested in access to Russian 
financial resources, discounted energy prices and free movement of labour, which leads to 
high remittances flows from emigrants (Spechler 2002; Abduvaliev and Bustillo, 2020). 
During the last decades, cross border financial transactions and labor-remittance flows 
between Russia and these countries have become increasingly important and Russia appears 
to influence regional growth mainly through the remittance channel and less through the 
financial channel. Russia, as the main destination for migrants from the CIS region, 
accumulates 88% of CIS migrants (CISSTAT, 2016), where Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine are net 
remittances-receiving countries. Long before the Russian economic crisis started in 2014, 
related to the Western economic sanctions against Russia over the Ukraine Crisis in mid-
2014, the labour migrants constituted approximately 49.6% of Tajikistan’s GDP, 38.1% of 
Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, and 16% of Uzbekistan’s GDP (World Bank, 2015b). Despite, 
cooperation with China is crucial for the Central Asian economies in terms of trade relation. 
Although, crisis in 2008/9 deteriorated cooperation between Russian and Central Asian, 
however the Chinese trade share to Central Asian countries did not decline within the crisis 
both within financial crisis in 2008-2009 and ongoing financial crisis since 2014. Even 
though Russia still remains the most important trading partner for Kazakhstan (after the EU) 
China is increasingly becoming an economic driver of the region that has already caught up 
in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Stronski and Ng 2018). 
In recent years, China has been developing infrastructure projects in the five Central Asian 
countries under the Belt and Road Initiative. The region is being transformed by China’s 
infrastructure investment, with the launch of railway logistics routes connecting Central Asia 
and Europe, and the development of highways, oil and gas pipelines, transmission networks, 
and optical fibre cables (Daisuke Kitade, 2019). Natural resources as well as their strategic 
location, especially their proximity to China, could serve as a good platform for the future 
development of Central Asian economies. 
In consequence, we must highlight that CIS intra-regional trade has not developed as 
in other regions. Most countries in Central Asia are establishing a closer trade relation with 
other nations outside the CIS (Krapohl and Vasilieva-Dienes, 2019), because of the factors 
mentioned above. Therefore, we can at least confirm the fact that the recent globalization 
process has not created a high volume of trade inside the region, but on the contrary, it has 









connected these nations with other external partners such as China or the EU, thus 
confirming the fifth hypothesis put forward in the introduction. 
 
 
4. Stylized facts about economic performance amongst CIS countries. 
 
The economic dependence of CIS countries mostly divides them into these two 
following categories:  
1. Net oil and gas exporters.  
2. Countries heavily dependent on migrant remittances and foreign aid (Official 
Development Assistance, ODA). 
 
CIS countries dispose of a significant endowment of natural resources accounting for 
nearly 5.5%-5.7% of global supplies of oil and 11.4%-11.6% of natural gas resources 
(CISTAT Report, 2012) where Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the main oil 
and gas exporting countries in CIS region, excluding Russia.  
CIS countries that belong to the second category of economic dependence reveal data 
of remittances between 5%-43% and ODA 2.1%-7.8% of GDP, respectively (World Bank 
Factbook, 2015). 
Figure 1.2. indicates that migrants’ remittances as a ratio to GDP exceed ODA in most 
CIS countries. USA, Germany, Turkey, Japan, Switzerland and France are the main ODA 
donors for CIS countries (OECD/DAC, 2015). From 2000 up to 2014, all CIS countries 
except Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine registered strong economic growth. From 2005 
until 2010, some CIS countries (Kyrgyzstan; from 2008 until 2009, Georgia; and from 2012 
until 2014, Ukraine) have suffered from socio-political disturbances and changes in 
leadership. Despite the relatively weaker economic performance of these three countries, the 
average annual growth rate of the rest of the CIS countries was 6.1% during the period 1998-
2016 (See Figure 1.3.). 
According to the Heritage Foundation and Index of Economic Freedom (2014), all CIS 
countries substantially increased their economic freedom positions. This improvement may 
have helped promote economic growth amongst these countries.  
If we look at the recent economic behaviour of CIS countries, we will find that CIS 









countries experienced four crises since the collapse of the USSR (Figure 1.4.).  
 
 
Source: World Bank, Factbook, 2015.  




Figure 1.3. CIS 11 annual average growth, 1998-2016 
 
     Source: World Economic Outlook, 2016. 
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international economic sanctions imposed by Western countries, following the Russian 
annexation of Crimea (Ukraine). Sanctions provoked a negative effect on Russian crude oil 
prices and led to a devaluation of the ruble against the US dollar (Wier et al., 2014; Kitroeff 
et al., 2014). This reduced the migrant remittances transferred from Russia to CIS countries. 
 




Note: Per cent change of gross domestic product, constant prices, volume of export and import of goods and 
services. 
Source: UNCTAD (2007), World Bank (2010), IMF; World Economic Outlook (2015). 
 
In 2014, CIS countries economic growth dropped from 1.25% to 5.25%, driven, in 
part, by lower commodity prices and Russia economic slowdown (IMF, 2015), which has a 
close relationship with CIS region through remittances, trade and the volume of investment 
(See Figure 1.5.). 
The lower Russian oil prices have been amplified by a slowdown in Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan domestic oil production, while delays in the development of new Kazakh oil 
fields has resulted in the decline of CIS oil exports by 2 percentage points to 3.5% in 2015 
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Figure 1.5. Relationship between economic growth of CIS countries and 
Russian real GDP growth (Annual percent change) 
 
Source: IMF Databases, 2017. 
Note: * CIS oil exporters: UZB, KAZ, TKM, AZE.  
         ** CIS oil importers: KGZ, ARM, TJK, GEO, UKR, BEL and MOL.  
 
 
energy imports from Russia exceeded 23 percent of their total energy consumption in 2016 
(Central Bank of Russia, 2017).  
In the CIS, oil importers’ domestic demand is weakened by declining remittances, as 
remittances are a key channel of transmission of shocks from Russia to CIS oil importers. 
The development prospect group of the World Bank (2015) reports that three CIS countries 
have ranked first, second and fourth amongst the top ten remittances recipient countries in 
the world according to the ratio of remittances to GDP. Remittances constitute about 41% 
of GDP in Tajikistan, 29 percent in the Kyrgyz Republic, 23 percent in Moldova and 19 
percent of GDP in Armenia as of 2016, with the bulk of these remittances originating in 
Russia. The Bank of America Merrill Lynch (2013) reported that a reduction of Russia’s 
GDP by 1% would reduce remittances inflows to Central Asian countries by 5%.  
Amongst CIS countries, the situation fluctuated more after the USSR dissolution, and, 
almost two decades after independence from the Soviet Union, they have developed healthier 
deeper links with the Russian economy. This is perceptible, despite the geographical tension 
and sanctions that have sharply decreased the oil price in Russia since late 2014, resulting in 









negative spillovers (trade, remittances, FDI) on CIS countries. An ongoing Russian crisis is 
an obvious example of how geopolitical risk is real and, in fact, can dramatically change a 
country’s economy, particularly in Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Russian 
politicians’ decisions might not only result in circumstances that sink their own country’s 
economy (Mirzaev, 2016), but could also make the lives worse off for residents of other 
countries who have economic and socio-cultural ties with Russia.  
 
 
4.  Inter-regional trade performance and FTA amongst CIS countries.  
CIS countries are suffering the effects of a changing regional trade relationship. 
According to the Head and Mayer (2008) study of post-colonial ties, a country’s trade with 
their colonizer typically falls by 60% and with siblings by 20% after 30 years of 
independence. However, after 27 years of independence, the relationship between CIS 
economies and Russian development, overall, through trade, financial and remittance 
channels is still strong (Table 1.1). The aim of this paper is not to test Head and Mayer’s 
findings, but rather to explore the extent to which Russian economic performance has a 
strong impact on neighbouring CIS countries. CIS countries have not yet managed to achieve 
considerable success in opening markets and in coordination of macroeconomic policies. 
IMF (2015) reports that trade links with Russia are generally weaker mostly in Central 
Asian countries, although for some CIS countries, trade exposure is still considerable. ‘In 
addition, indirect spillovers through confidence effects and common investor linkages could 
be substantial, which is difficult to quantify’ (Stepanyan et al., 2015: 13). FDI is another 
important channel of spillovers from Russia, which is highly relevant for CIS countries. 
The trade volume of Russia with the CIS increased since 2001. The maximum value 
of Russia’s trade surplus reached $33 billion in 2008, in contrast with $3.8 billion in 1994. 
After the 2009 downturn, Russia remained a large net exporter, although the trade surplus 
decreased by $8 billion (Andreev, 2010; CISTAT Report, 2011). Notwithstanding, Russia is 
an important export destination and remains a relevant niche market for CIS countries. For 
instance, Belarus and Turkmenistan have the largest exposure, with exports to Russia 
exceeding 10 percent of GDP (IMF, 2015). Russia accounts for about half of non-oil exports 
for Azerbaijan, and Armenian food products have been a source of dynamism for the Russian 
economy, while a quarter of Moldova’s agriculture exports were destined for Russia in 2015 
(IMF report, 2016). Kazakhstan is still the main trading partner of Russia in iron, manganese, 









copper and chromium ores and concentrates, aluminium, coal, ferrous metals and uranium 
(Basargin, 2012). 
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Sources: IMF Database, 2017.   
Notes: (*) Gas exports to Russia; Gas/energy imports from Russia are scaled by country’s energy consumption; other 
variables are scaled by GDP. Turkmenistan is an associate member of the CIS; Georgia has been a member of the CIS during 
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Russia accounts for about a quarter of Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s gas exports 
(down from around 70 percent during the global financial crisis). Imports from Russia, 
including energy imports, constitute more than 5 percent of GDP for most CIS countries and 
energy imports from Russia to Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Tajikistan and Ukraine exceeded 
20 percent of their total energy consumption (IMF, 2015). However, some CIS oil importing 
countries may not benefit from the lower price provided by Russia, since contracts on gas 
supply are usually long term and, in some cases, with fixed prices over several years.  
The current Russian financial crisis has had adverse spillovers to CIS oil importers that 
account for more than 2.5 percentage points of downward growth, while for the CIS oil 









exporters, negative spillovers from Russia contributed to around 1% downward revision of 
their economic growth (IMF, 2016).  
The foreign trade pattern of CIS countries is also diverse. Openness promotes a more 
efficient allocation of resources through comparative advantage. The average trade openness 
(percentage of Export + Import over GDP) amongst CIS on average remains 96.1% in 2014 
(Figure 1.6). The World Bank (2015) reports that some of the CIS countries are ‘more open’, 
while some of them relatively low. For example, on average, trade openness to Belarus is 
131.8, Moldova 129.1, Turkmenistan 123.9, Kyrgyzstan 112.6, Tajikistan -108.2, Ukraine 
104.5, Azerbaijan 88.5, Kazakhstan 85.5, Georgia 79.5, Armenia 69.6, Uzbekistan 62.3, and 
Russia 56.3. We must mention that trade openness figures amongst several CIS countries are 
above 100% mainly because these figures are from small countries with very high import 
levels, which are not thoroughly consumed inside the country, under the risk of double 
accountancy. 
Figure 1.6. indicates that in 2016 the openness to trade dramatically decreased by 
71.4% due to the ongoing financial crisis of Russia (Dorning et al., 2016), something that 
reveals CIS countries’ dependence on Russian economic performance. 
The objective of creating a deeper trade link amongst post-Soviet States, i.e. the 
objective of favoring commercial integration, requires a certain degree of political 
integration.  
On September 1994 was made the first multilateral FTA in the CIS area (CIS 
Agreement from 15.04.1994 ‘On the establishment of a free trade area’), which included 10 
CIS countries27 and was aimed at the future establishment of an economic union. The 
agreement was expected to come into force after the signing parties agree on the list of 
exemptions from it. However, if we look at the realization of these agreements, we will find 
that most of FTA measures remained dysfunctional (Kulik et al., 2013). In 2008, Georgia, 
due to Russian political intervention in the Georgian region of Abkhazia, and in 2010, 
Ukraine due to the Orang Revolution, decided to leave the Economic Union. 
Hence, multilateral PTAs (Preferential trade agreements) did not exist in the CIS area 
until the end of 2012. Thus, CIS countries attempted to create a multilateral PTA in a bilateral 
regime, concluding agreements in a relatively short time, followed by subsequent approval 
 
                                                 
27 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. 










Figure 1.6. CIS countries: openness to trade in percentage, 2001-2016  
 
 
of the list of reciprocal exemptions and simultaneous agreements on terms of their 
elimination. Summary table including information on PTAs effective in 2016 in the CIS area 
is presented in Table 1.2. 
Additionally, other integration processes were developing. In January 2014, Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus signed the agreement for the creation of the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU), which came into force on 2015. The main aim of this union is the creation of 
a common market for labour and capital. However, according to UN reports, despite having 
signed an agreement, CIS countries’ trade policy is far from common. The number of non- 
coincident import tariff rates is very high, around 50%. The reason is partly the lack of a 
strong supra national institution to control national trade policies. Moreover, there are  
several agreements within the CIS Economic Union that remain dysfunctional due to 
governance and institutional setbacks in the CIS region (Efremova, 2012; Mazhikeev et al., 
2015). Grinsberg (2005) concluded that over 1,000 official trade agreements were  
signed, but only about 10% are effective.  
Clearly, Russia is a dominant power in this project in the EEU, and its political interests 
may outweigh economic ones. Four potential EEU members (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia 
and Kyrgyz Republic) have been forcefully pushed into the agreement firstly because 
Russia is the most accessible market for their exports and migration, and a source of cheap 
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Note: (bl) – bilateral agreement; 95- year of the signing the protocol on the complete abolition of 
exemptions from the free trade; *PTA with exemptions; CU – Customs union, EEU -  Eurasian Economic 
Union, CES – Common economic space; cur – currently.  
Source: Listing of bilateral international agreements of the Russian Federation – Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation, World Bank Global PTA Database, WTO PTA Database, 
UNESCAP PTA Database, CIASSTAT Database. 
In force Signed, but inactive No agreement 









Russia is the most accessible market for their exports and migration, and a source of cheap 
natural resources. 
A closer regional integration among CIS countries could complement the integration 
process with the world economy. Improvements of institutional bases of the organization 
would be the best guarantee of development. Because of poor control over the 
implementation of its decisions, along with the unwillingness of a number of them for further 
integration, the role of the Commonwealth in promoting growth and stability in the region 






In this section we will address two important issues. Firstly, to what extent do free 
trade agreements, institutional and geographical factors favour trade flows amongst CIS 
countries? Secondly, whether the Russian economy exerts a strong influence on CIS 
countries’ bilateral flows or not. 
The gravity equation provides a general empirical framework suited to the examination 
of these issues. This model allows us to identify the impact on bilateral trade of variables 
such as infrastructure, landlockedness, institutions, and free trade agreements, once all other 
structural determinants of trade, mainly GDP, contiguity and Russian economic 
development, are controlled for. We follow the basic model suggested by Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003).  
We applied a fixed effects (FE) model, which assumes constant but not equal 
individual country effects, which leads to a fixed effect model.  
The selection of the best model specification has been made using the following 
expression: 
 
𝐼𝑛 (𝑋𝑡𝑖) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1,𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑢𝑠𝐶𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑢𝑠𝑠𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑚𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑜𝑣𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑖 + 
𝛽8𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑀𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9𝑃𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9𝑉𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑋𝑡𝑖 +  𝛽9𝐶𝐼𝑆𝐹𝑇𝐴𝑡𝑖 + 𝜔𝑡𝑖;  
𝜔𝑡𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑡𝑖  , 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇; 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁, 










The second method is a random effect (RE) method, and the assumption is a situation 
where the country effects are not constant, but are treated such as disturbances. 
We estimated our model employing a panel data set of bilateral export flows between 
Russia and each of the 11 CIS countries. The time span for the analysis is 17 years from 
1997 to 2014, due to the limited data availability. We test the importance of the trade regime 
(Free Trade Association Regime between the two countries partners). Additionally, we 
check the effect of the relevance of Russian economic policy and performance on bilateral 
commerce figures, the reason why bilateral Russia-other CIS partners’ flows are used.  
We will test the link between each country’s institutions’28 quality and trade flows. In 
addition to these variables, we include a rich set of control variables, such as GDP, 
landlockedness and the effect of contiguity. However, we do not use distance, as it does not 
show statistical significance because Moscow, which is the main trading centre-partner for 
most CIS countries, is very far from the frontiers of all CIS countries. The definition, 






















                                                 
28 As measured by the World Bank governance indicators. 



















Log of export of country i to 
country j, f.o.b. value in 
million USD 
   
IMF-DOT 
InGDPit 
Log of GDP of country i, in 
current USD, in million 
USD. 
 + WDI 
InGDPijt 
Log of GDP of country j, in 
current USD, in million USD 
where i exporting , j 
importing countries 
 +  
WDI 
Landlocked 
Dummy for landlocked  1 if country i and 
j are landlocked 
and 0 otherwise 
-  CEPII 
Contigij 
Dummy contiguity ij for 
having a common border 
between the countries 
1 if countries i 







(as % of CIS trade) 
 
 
An indicator of the national 
savings that are available for 
investment abroad—
expressed as a ratio of the 
combined CIS trade  
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Measures the perceptions of 
public services’ quality, civil 
services’ quality, quality of 
formulation and 
implementation of polices 
and credibility of 
government’s commitment 
to follow the policies for 
country i and j 
Goveffit = (corjt + 
lawjt + regjt +acc 
jt+ +polstab jt) 
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effectiveness, political 
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regulatory quality, voice and 
accountability, government 
effectiveness, 
regjt + acc jt + 






Measures the perceptions of 
governmental capabilities to 
draw and implement policies 
for development of private 
sector for country i and j 
Regit = (corjt + 
lawjt + govjt +acc 
jt +polstab jt) 





and Absence of 
Violence/ 
Terrorism 
Measures the perceptions of 
the likelihood of government 
overthrow, political violence 
and terrorism for country i 
and j 
Polstabit = (corjt 
+ lawjt + regjt + 
govjt +acc jt) 




Rule of Law Measures the perceptions of 
the contract reinforcement 
quality, respect for property 
rights, the quality of police 
and the courts, likelihood of 
crime and violence for 
country i and j 
Lawit = (corjt + 
regjt + govjt +acc 
jt +polstab jt) 






Measures perceptions of the 
degree to which citizens can 
participate in government 
selection; freedom of 
expression, freedom of 
association and media for 
country i and j  
Accit = (corjt + 
lawjt + regjt  + 
govjt +polstab jt) 






Dummy for an FTA between 
country i and j 
1 if countries i 
and j have and 
FTA; 0 
otherwise. 





Note: The institutional variables are taken from the World Bank’s database of Worldwide Governance 
Indicators and calculated separately for the exporting and the importing country as a simple average of six 
indicators. These six indicators represent quality of governance in the three main areas: Selection, monitoring 
and replacement process of governments.  
 
 
7.  Empirical results. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 1.4.  
Our results suggest that Russian economic performance is positively related to bilateral 
trade flows, so we can state that Russia’s economy’s health (proxied with the inclusion of 
Russian Income and Russian Current Account variable) positively affects bilateral trade 
flows. It also should be noted that trade between CIS countries is favoured by the existence 
of a FTA bilateral agreement, confirming the hypotheses put forward above. The regression 
results in columns (1) and (4) in Table 1.4 reveal that FTA has positive and statistically 
significant effects on trade flows. 











Table 1.4. GDP growth rate in CIS countries: Regression results 




















GDP_X_USD 0,194833*** 0,154915*** 0,0326209*** 0,0304988*** 
GDP_M_USD 0,114661*** 0,0986743*** 0,001122547* 0,000886885 
Landlocked_0 -2,11573*** -0,48602*** -2,59631*** -2,58965*** 
Contiguity 0,0845933 0,0802030 0,0860580 0,104733 
RUS_CURR_ACC 0,0431802*** 0,0263873*** 0,207349*** 0,199077*** 
RUS_INCOME 0,0428229** 0,0244380*** 3,44454*** 3,14826*** 
GOVEFF_M -- 0,248074*** -- 0,000799202 
REGQ_M -- 0,638863*** -- -0,0249250 
PSAV_X -- 1,17621*** -- 0,284640*** 
Voice_Acc_X -- -1,47401*** -- -0,601901*** 
CIS FTA_X 1,39310*** -- -- 1,49478*** 
-- -- -- -2,30611*** -2,17224*** 
-- -- -- -2,49145*** -2,34241*** 
-- -- -- -3,04355*** -2,88818*** 
-- -- -- -1,95947*** -1,89300*** 
-- -- -- 4,96002*** 4,46442*** 
-- -- -- -3,06073*** -2,84299*** 
-- -- -- 0,171544* 0,110577*** 
-- -- -- -3,38115*** 3,14419*** 
-- -- -- -3,42003*** -3,16764*** 
-- -- -- 3,59030*** 3,24748*** 
-- -- -- 2,35479*** 2,15142*** 
No. of observations                 2512                           2512                   2512                          2512 
R-squared                                0.73                            0.81                    0.69                           0.74 
Adjusted R-squared                0.68                             0.79                   0.67                           0.70 









Regarding signs, estimated coefficients across different estimators show the expected 
relationship with the dependent variable. 
Trade, as expected, is positively associated with exporter and importer GDPs. 
However, the coefficients estimated for the exporting and importing countries do slightly 
differ from each other. Supply determinants are more significant than demand ones: 
coefficients for the RE model range from 0.154 to 0.194, and from 0.030 to 0.032 by FE 
models for the exporting country. For the importing country, our coefficient ranges only 
from 0.098 to 0.114 (RE) and from 0.001 to 0.0008 (FE). 
In contrast, landlockedness is negatively correlated with trade. Both our RE model 
procedures show negative results of -2.115 and -0.486 for that variable, while FE models 
show similar negative results. Although in many gravity papers, the common border is found 
to have a positive correlation to trade, in our model it does not register a statistically 
significant result.  
As we mentioned in Section 5, we do not use distance, as it does not show statistical 
significance because the huge distance between CIS countries and major industrial areas of 
Russia (Moscow, Ural and Siberia). 
Regarding institutional variables, our estimates show that government effectiveness 
and regulatory quality (among importing countries) register the expected positive and 
significant sign for the RE procedure, while the absence of violence (exporting countries) 
reveal the expected positive result for both the FE and the RE procedures. However, the 
measure of the level of democracy (Voice Accountability) appears to be negatively 
correlated with export flows. 
 
 
8.  Conclusions 
 
Our findings suggest that the creation of FTA has positively influenced trade flows 
amongst CIS countries, mainly because FTA allow CIS countries to decrease the size of 
transit costs. 
Secondly, the CIS countries can give the largest boost to their exports by improving 
their governance quality, especially in the areas of government effectiveness, regulation and 
absence of violence, the level of democracy. However, voice accountability does not seem 









to favour trade growth. Although improvement of governance quality in the CIS countries is 
a challenging process that could take some time, it is definitely a job worth accomplishing. 
Thirdly, the next factors that have considerable effects on CIS trade growth is 
landlockedness due to the lack of access to the sea ports (Grigoriou, 2007; Kulipanova, 2012) 
and transit systems in the CIS region (Roballand, 2003). In support of Hypothesis 3, our 
empirical analyses suggest that geographical disadvantage negatively affects CIS trade 
flows. High transport costs are one of the main obstacle to the reorientation of CIS trade 
flows. Because overland distances are more penalizing than sea distances due to their higher 
costs per mile (Celine and Grigoriou, 2008), CIS landlocked countries (particularly Central 
Asian countries) are dependent on sovereign transit countries for their trade. Moreover, high 
transportation costs amongst CIS countries have a negative impact, not just on transportation 
budgets, but also on broader supply chain and financial performance.  
In support of the final hypothesis, our study suggests that Russia’s economic policy 
still having a significant impact on trade growth in the rest CIS countries, primarily via 
remittances, FDI and exports and the strong economic relationship between Russia and CIS 
countries are still greater than might be expected. Thus, those experts who have foreseen that 
a country’s trade with their colonizer typically falls by specific percentage after 30 years of 
independence, or predicted that Russia influence would quickly vanish among CIS countries 
after the collapse Soviet Union, were mistaken. 
Furthermore, the globalization process does not seem to have exerted so far such a 
strong influence on CIS countries intra-regional trade growth. Geographical obstacles, 
problems with the management of the different Free Trade Agreements or certain lack of 
commercial complementariness have hindered trade expansion amongst CIS countries. 
Therefore, we can confirm the fifth hypothesis put forward in the introduction. In 
consequence, there should be an additional joint effort to reform regional trade agreements, 
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Section 3.2. Impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty 





The main goal of this paper is to assess the effect of remittances on economic growth and 
poverty reduction amongst the post-Soviet states, compared with other external sources of 
capital, such as foreign aid and foreign direct investment. In this paper we use a panel data 
set on economic growth and poverty estimates (poverty headcount, poverty gap and poverty 
severity) in 10 selected former post-Soviet republics i.e. Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). We found that, on average, a 1% increase in remittance flows provokes around 
a 0.25% rise in per capita GDP and a 2% decline in poverty severity. Remittances seem to 
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International migration still appears to be one of the most important issues of the global 
agenda, since it generates enormous economic, social and cultural repercussions in both 
sending and receiving countries. Over one billion people in the world (more than one in 
seven people) are migrants (International Organization of Migration, 2015). Over the recent 
three decades, payments made by migrants abroad to their families in their home countries, 
known as remittances, are attracting increasing attention because of their rising volume, as 
well as their effect on the destination countries. The volume of remittances and compensation 
for employees received by developing countries has grown dramatically, from around 
US$400 million in 1970 to US$440 billion in 2015 (World Development Indicators WDI, 
2008, 2016). The most relevant destinations for international remittances were India, 
Philippines, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan and Ukraine, whereas amongst remittances’ 
source countries, USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland are the leaders (WDI, 2015). 
Amongst developing countries, remittances have to be considered as the most stable 
type of financial foreign currency inflow (Gupta et al., 2007). For many developing 
countries, remittances’ revenue exceeds foreign direct investment, official development 
assistance (ODA) and portfolio equity inflows (Chami et al., 2008).  
Moreover, total remittances could be 50% higher than official estimates when those 
sent through informal channels are included (World Bank, 2006). In some cases, earnings 
submitted by international migrants constitute a significant portion of a country’s GDP: from 
15–20% in Tonga, Lesotho, Albania, and Yemen; up to 25–41% in Liberia, Moldova, Nepal, 
Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan (WDI, 2015). 
Regarding the economic destination of remittances, they are mostly spent on 
consumption expenditure, rather than on productive investment. Therefore, their 
contribution to an increase in productivity and economic growth depends on the careful 
allocation of this money (Catrinescu et al., 2006). Consequently, the utilization of 
remittances revenues by households plays a crucial role in their impact on growth. 
Amongst the positive effects of remittances, we can mention not only poverty 
alleviation, but also that it allows for smoother patterns of consumption, which provoke a 
multiplier effect on aggregate demand and output (Acosta et al., 2007). Recipient households 
can use remittances to finance current consumption, asset accumulation, human capital 
formation or to serve as insurance (Yang and Martinez, 2006), whereas development loans 
(Official Development Assistance, ODA) are more expensive since they force the user to 









pay interest rates. Moreover, remittances transferred through either formal or informal 
channels by migrants prevent the government from wasting those resources, as often happens 
with ODA (Sander, 2004; Pieke et al., 2005). 
Several recent studies have analysed household investments in human capital 
development amongst developing countries by proving the existence of a correlation 
between remittances and child education (Lopez-Cordova, 2004). However, remittances’ 
effects might not last in the long-run for households, particularly if they do not properly 
invest them. Furthermore, international migration of either skilled or unskilled labourers has 
a different opportunity cost, i.e. skilled labour refers to that which requires workers who 
have acquired specialized training or have learned a skill-set required to perform the work. 
According to the Agency on Statistics under the president of the Republic of Tajikistan 
(2016), one-third of Tajik migrants are holders of a secondary professional or higher 
education degree, a particular feature that increases migration opportunity costs. 
However, few studies have analysed amongst developing economies the link between 
migration and skilled-unskilled wage inequality. It is important to note that the unskilled 
labour that emigrates and returns to their countries of origin after a few years might bring 
back useful skills acquired abroad (Romer, 1990). However, the brain drain caused by the 
migration of highly skilled workers from developing countries is especially harmful for two 
reasons. Firstly, skilled workers are relatively less abundant in developing countries and 
consequently, their relocation to other countries could have a negative effect on productivity 
and economic growth (Sharipov, 2012). Secondly, government investment in their education 
is costly, and in case they do not come back to their home country, the return of investment 
in public education would fall (Isomatov, 2010). 
Despite the increasing importance of remittances over total international capital flows, 
the relationship between remittances and growth amongst Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)30 countries has not so far been adequately studied. 
This study is the first to measure the impact of remittances on economic growth and 
poverty reduction in 10 selected former post-Soviet republics, i.e. ten CIS countries, using 
panel data to analyse the period 1997–2016. Our hypotheses are tested utilizing the random-
effect, fixed-effects and least squares model with and without instrumental variables. 
                                                 
30 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 









Moreover, we test the extent to which CIS countries’ growth was associated with Russian 
economic performance through the remittances channel. 
As we attempt to assess the effect of remittances on per capita GDP and poverty levels, 
we are going to test the two following hypotheses: 
H1: The volume of remittances is positively associated with a higher standard of living 
(higher per capita GDP). 
H2: The volume of remittances is positively associated with poverty reduction.  
 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a comprehensive 
literature survey, whilst Section 3 discusses the basic features of remittances amongst CIS 
countries. Section 4 presents the econometric estimation and the expected signs of the 
utilized variables, whereas Section 5 describes the variables, sources as well as data used in 
the analysis. In Section 6 we examine the main results obtained in the empirical research. 
Last but not least, Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Literature review.  
 
Remittances are usually measured utilizing three variables: workers’ remittances, 
employee compensation and migrant transfers (Serino et al., 2011). A common practice 
amongst researchers studying the effects of remittances is to sum all these three components 
and consider the sum as the level of remittances. In spite of the benefits of each of these 
individual three different categories, workers’ remittances’ total amount is the best 
estimation for the financial inflows due to migrants’ labour activity abroad. 
Over the last few decades, the most studied aspect of remittances has been their impact 
on economic growth, not only because of their political relevance but also due to the 
numerous ways through which remittances might affect economic growth. Amongst studies 
supporting an optimistic view regarding remittances effect on growth, firstly Chami et al. 
(2008), who used panel data of 157 countries over the period 1990–2005, stated that 
remittances have a significant effect on welfare and economic growth, reduce the country 
risk, improve the sustainability of government debt and increase household savings in 
recipient countries. Adelman and Taylor (1990, pp. 387–407) found that “every dollar 
Mexican migrants send back home increases Mexico’s GNP from $2.69 up to $3.17, 









depending on which household income group received the remittances”. Glytsos (2005), in 
their empirical results, report that a decrease in remittances slows down economic growth 
more severely than an increase speeds it up, in reference to Egypt, Greece, Morocco and 
Portugal. Additionally, Sufian et al. (2008), using panel data for the period 1975–2006, 
confirmed the existence of a positive relationship between remittances and GDP per capita 
growth amongst Middle Eastern and North African countries. Furthermore, Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2010), analysing an unbalanced panel data spanning from 1980 to 2004 for 37 African 
countries, found that a 10% increase of remittances would lead to a 0.3% rise in GDP per 
capita.  
Evidence from around the globe suggests that remittances should be directed towards 
investment, such as in small businesses aimed at improving a country’s production base. On 
average, around 10% of remittances are found to be saved and invested. For instance, in 
Ghana and Guatemala, about one-third of remittances are used in order to start small 
businesses and house construction (UNCTAD, 2010, pp. 11–13). Massey et al. (1998), who 
studied 30 communities in West-Central Mexico, concluded that earnings from labour in the 
United States provided an important source for start-up capital in 21% of new business 
creation. Woodru and Zenteno (2001), who affirm that remittances are responsible for almost 
20% of the capital invested in microenterprises throughout urban Mexico, have also found 
such positive effect. More precisely, McCormick and Wahba (2001), using a survey of 1,526 
Egyptian migrants in 1988, found that the majority of migrants who worked and earned 
money abroad became entrepreneurs, self-employed or business owners in Egypt. 
Partly correcting the above-mentioned results, several studies highlight the crucial role 
of institutions on the relationship between remittances and economic growth. Remittances 
tend to boost economic growth only when social institutions are better developed (Chami et 
al., 2003). Nevertheless, surprisingly very little empirical work would come even close to 
analysing the interplay amongst these three factors. Faini (2002) claimed that the positive 
effect of remittances on economic growth might be found when there is an improvement of 
productive infrastructure, a reduction in uncertainty and an accumulation of households’ 
assets. Ratha (2003) found that during 1996–2000, countries with an average level of 
corruption received remittances that averaged 0.5% of GDP, compared to 1.98% for those 
with higher levels of corruption. More precisely, Catrinescu et al. (2006), after analysing 
163 countries over the period 1970–2003, assert that institutions play a key role in 
encouraging remittances’ positive influence on economic growth.  









The next group of world evidence suggests that remittances promote human capital 
accumulation in recipient countries by enabling younger members of households to continue 
schooling rather than having to work to contribute to household income. Recent studies have 
proved a positive and significant correlation between remittances and human capital 
accumulation in some developing countries (Kwok and Leland, 1982; Vidal, 1998; Hanson 
and Woodru, 2003; Barajas et al., 2009). Authors argue that the first possible link between 
remittances and education is through repayment of loans used to finance educational 
investments (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006), showing that the 
prospects of migration make education a profitable investment for the family. Hence, 
remittances might be positively correlated with human capital accumulation when most 
migrants come back to their origin countries. Docquier et al. (2001), using panel data for 127 
countries, showed that countries with initially low levels of human capital and low migration 
rates enjoy from higher human capital stock growth rates. They also affirm that in origin 
countries with more than 20% of highly educated migration, where highly educated people 
are above 5%, brain drain is very likely to happen. Moreover, Stark and Wang (2001) and 
Cinar and Docquier (2004) claim that with the incentive to acquire education, brain drain 
may even affect positively migrants’ sending economies, if labour migrants acquired 
additional knowledge abroad favours the creation of a business or a trade network in the 
country of origin. A recent empirical result on the impact of remittances on human capital 
has been found by Azizi (2017), using data for 125 developing countries from 1990 to 2015: 
this author concludes that a 10% increase in remittances will lead to a 3% increase in public 
school enrolment, 2% in private school enrolment and 1.1% in school completion rate. 
However, despite the large amount of evidence defending the positive and statistically 
significant effect of remittances on economic growth and human capital accumulation, some 
empirical papers deny the positive impact of remittances on the macroeconomic performance 
of recipient countries. For instance, a negligible effect of remittances on economic growth 
is found in the studies of Spatafora (2005), where the author states that there is no direct link 
between real per capita output growth and remittances. Additionally, Chami et al. (2008), 
using panel data for 113 developing countries, find that remittances have a negative effect 
on economic growth. Habib and Nourin (2006), who utilize a data panel set for South East 
Asian economies over 1996–2005, have also described a similar negative effect of 
remittances on economic growth. This study suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between migrant remittances and per capita GDP growth in Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and 









Indonesia, whereas this relationship is positive in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Philippines. 
Moreover, Barajas et al. (2009), using a dataset for 84 recipient countries covering the period 
from 1970 to 2004, claimed that there is an insignificant effect of remittances on economic 
growth. 
Regarding the size and the education level of international migration, the brain drain 
is now much more extensive than it was three decades ago (Frédéric and Marfouk, 2005). 
The extra education gained by the younger members of households would likely have little 
effect on domestic economic growth if these educated younger members were to emigrate. 
Haque and Jahangir (1999) indicate that the number of skilled emigrants from Africa 
increased from 1,800 in 1960 to 23,000 in 1987, whereas the United States Immigration Act 
(2009) indicates that highly educated people amongst immigrants increased from 110,200 a 
year in 1992 to 465,120 in 2006. It is not surprising that CIS countries have also experienced 
brain drain specific effects in recent years. In 2006 Russia implemented a new program, the 
so-called “Resettlement program compatriots in Russia” which is aimed at attracting skilled 
labour from post-Soviet states, resulting in more than 600,000 families relocating to Russia 
since 2010 (Federal Migration Services of Russia, 2016).  
Apart from the controversial relationship between remittances and growth, many 
studies have also examined the link between remittances and poverty reduction. For instance, 
Adams and Page (2005) studied a set of 71 developing countries, finding that a 10% increase 
of migrant remittances leads to a 1.9% decline in the level of poverty. Lopez-Cordova 
(2006), using 1,782 Mexican households in 2003, found that a 10% increase in the share of 
remittances over GDP led to a 0.77% reduction of people living under headcount poverty 
and a 0.53% fall of people living under squared poverty and poverty gap.  
Jongwanich (2007) strongly remarks that remittances do have a significant impact on 
poverty reduction and economic growth through human capital accumulation, increasing 
income, smoothing consumption and easing capital constraints to domestic investment. He 
used panel data, employing a Generalized Method of Moments procedure to estimate the 
impact of remittances on economic growth and investment for 17 Asian and Pacific countries 
for the period 1993–2003, finding a positive effect. Similarly, Acosta et al. (2007) studied 
the relationship between remittances, poverty and inequality using a panel of data for 28 
Latin American and Caribbean countries during 1970–2000, and they conclude that 
remittances reduce poverty and inequality. According to Abdih et al. (2012), remittances 
keep many people out of poverty by enabling them to consume more than they could 









otherwise, in particular to maintain a higher level of consumption during economic 
adversity. 
However, a number of authors are concerned about the income effect of remittances, 
according to which people could afford to work less and therefore this would diminish the 
labour supply, hence creating a moral hazard for recipient countries for two reasons. Firstly, 
the moral hazard impact appears at the household level, particularly when the migrant’s 
family members reduce their work efforts after enjoying higher wage-earning opportunities 
in labour-receiving countries (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Mansoor and Quillin, 2006,). 
Secondly, a different kind of moral hazard occurs at the state level when remittances benefits 
reduce the pressure on the government to apply reforms, i.e. remittances pose a moral hazard 
problem by reducing political reform. According to Shera and Meyer (2013) “compensatory 
remittances that ensure the public against adverse economic shocks and insulate them from 
government policy reduce households’ incentives to pressure the government to implement 
reforms to facilitate economic growth”. Chami et al. (2003) emphasize that remittances may 
hinder governments’ incentives to maintain fiscal policy discipline, and assert that 
governments may take advantage of the fiscal space afforded by private consumption 
financed with remittances. Similarly, Barajas et al. (2009), employing panel data for 115 
developing countries, suggest as well that remittances have a negative effect on governance 
incentives. Barajas et al. (2012), focusing on the relationship between remittances and 
government policies, conclude that remittances reduce public spending in countries with 
governance issues. In other words, public subsidies can be replaced by remittances that will 
work as private subsidies, and therefore “households will not have the incentive to monitor 
the government and exert pressure on it for change when they are insured through 
remittances” (Ebeke et al., 2013, pp. 6-9). Another group of authors claims that the negative 
effect can be produced when remittance inflows trigger an increase in households’ income, 
which leads to a rise of aggregate demand when part of demand is oriented to non-tradable 
goods. Hence, higher demand can imply a rise in inflation, the so-called Dutch Disease 
(Acosta et al., 2007). Supporting such evidence, Chami et al. (2008), using panel data for 
113 countries over the period 1970-1998, conclude that remittances differ greatly from 
private flows in terms of motivation and they do not appear to be a significant source of 
capital for economic development, since they could reduce economic growth through a 
Dutch Disease effect.  
To summarize, regarding the literature about the effect of remittances on economic 









development, we find that experts’ evidence on the issue is ambiguous. A large number of 
authors has proved the positive effects of remittances; hence, our hypothesis would be 
empirically confirmed. The long- or short-term effect of remittances depends on the extent 
to which households use them productively. We perceive that both skilled and unskilled 
migration play a crucial role in the economy, as they have a different opportunity cost for 
both origin and destination countries. Remittances raise the standard of living of recipient 
countries through facilitating investment in children’s education and human capital 
formation, increasing consumption, reducing income inequality and poverty level, taking 
into account their institutional framework. In spite of the positive effects of remittances, the 
negative effects should not be disregarded, as potential costs of remittances requirements 
ease pressure on governments for implementing the reforms that reduce external imbalances 
and labour effort, which thereby increases the level of moral hazard amongst recipient 
countries. This is why we utilize panel data for CIS countries in order to check empirically 
whether remittances enhance economic growth and/or reduce the level of poverty. 
 
 
3. Stylized facts regarding remittances amongst CIS countries. 
In 2015, the World Bank estimated that total world remittance flows reached $438 
billion, from which over a fifth (22%) corresponds to transition economies, and almost 11% 
to the CIS economies.  
Before exploring the scenario where migration flows amongst CIS countries are 
located, let us analyse some of the literature regarding the current tendencies of the closest 
to the European Union (EU) CIS countries, i.e. Eastern European countries (Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine). Some authors assert that there is a pattern of East-West migration 
from Eastern European countries to the EU. For instance, Jelínková et al. (2011) found that 
people from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine did not migrate for ethical and political reasons, 
but rather mainly due to economic ones. Supporting Jelínková’s idea, Čajka et al. (2014) 
looked more precisely at the problem, using panel data for Eastern European states (EES) 
working either in the Visegrad group (V431) countries or in the rest of European Union 
Member States (EU MS) in cases of visa abolition over the period 2008–2012. They 
                                                 
31 The Visegrad Group or V4 is a cultural and political alliance of four Central European states - the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.  









concluded that migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine are moving to work in the EU 
Member States as seasonal workers and do not intend to live in the EU, as their main 
motivation for working in EU countries is the wage gap, i.e. the main effects are pull factors 
but not push factors. Moreover, based on their empirical results, they affirm that a “visa 
abolition is not going to dramatically increase migration to the Eastern European countries 
in the EU Member States” (Čajka et al., 2014, pp. 15–26). 
Moreover, Catrinescu et al., (2006) concluded that remittances and skills acquired by 
migrants from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine in the EU MS can be quickly used in their 
source economy upon their return to their home country and that such scenario is similar to 
the situation between Russian and Central Asian countries’ migration stocks. Russia, as the 
main destination for migrants from the CIS region, accumulates 88% of CIS migrants 
(CISSTAT, 2016), where Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine are net remittances-receiving countries. 
Kazakhstan is also a main destination for migrants from the CIS region, particularly from 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but it is not as significant as Russia. The total value of 
international remittances amongst CIS countries has increased more than 32 times, i.e. from 
5.7 billion US$ in 2000 to 18.9 billion US$ in 2014. Ukraine is the largest recipient of 
remittances in the region, followed by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Armenia. If we look at the 
volume of inward remittances in individual CIS countries, remittances inflows for Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine have increased by 38.1–42.3 times, from 2000 to 2014. Following 
them are: Armenia 16.5 times, Azerbaijan 9.5 times, Belarus 8.1-8.4 times, Moldova 6.1 
times and Georgia 4.6 times. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not provide official 
information concerning personal remittances received in current US dollars. However, the 
Central Bank of Russia’s annual report (2016) revealed that their remittances amounted 
between 12–15% of Uzbek GDP and 1.5% of Turkmen GDP in 2014, respectively.  
The remittances inflow increase from Russia to CIS countries has a direct relationship 
with the increasing number of migrants towards Russia (Federal State Statistical Services of 
Russian Federation (Rosstat), 2016). According to the Rosstat report (2010) until 1997, 
every person who changed his or her place of residence for more than 45 days was counted 
as a migrant and this included a large number of individuals who were in the country 
temporarily for business, study or personal visits. From 1997 until 2011, only migrants with 
permanent-type registration were counted, regardless of the duration of their stay. Starting 
from 2011, temporary migrants registering and residing in a place for nine months or more 









were also included in the statistics. This was one of the main factors behind the dramatic 
increase in the number of international migrants recorded starting in 2011 (Chudinovskikh 
and Denisenko, 2014). However, another group of experts states that the sharp increase of 
migration to Russia in recent decades has mostly had a direct association with Russia’s lack 
of demographic resources. Because of the low birth rate and high death rate in Russia, 
combined with insufficient labour mobility within the local population, there is a need for 
foreign labour (Moiseenko et al., 2009; Kuzminov, 2013). Moreover, Chudinovskikh (2014) 
claims that the project applied by Russia, the so-called “Resettlement program compatriots 
in Russia” sharply increased the number of migrants from Central Asia to Russia.  
The development prospect group of the World Bank (2016) reports that three CIS 
countries are listed amongst the world top ten countries in the world for receiving remittances 
according to the ratio of remittances to GDP (Figure 2.12).  
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2017 
Long before the Russian economic crisis, triggered by the Western economic sanctions 
against Russia over the Ukraine Crisis in mid-2014, the labour migrants provided 
approximately 49.6% of Tajikistan’s GDP, 38.1% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, 26.9% of 
Moldova’s GDP and 16% of Uzbekistan’s GDP (World Bank, 2015). In 2016, compared to 
2013, remittances in Central Asian countries decreased on average around 30% (Figure 2.2). 





















Figure 2.1. Remittances inflow as a percentage of GDP, 2017









decline of remittances volume by 14–26%. Although the ratio of remittances to GDP is not 
significant for Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Belarus, these countries also experienced a sharp 
downturn ranging from 38.9 to 59.8%. 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2016 
 
Brownbridge and Canagarajah (2010) claim that the reduction of remittances provokes 
a drop in imports of consumer goods, whilst households still have to hold high levels of 
consumption (for instance paying housing rents) and investment in housing. Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch (2013) reported that a reduction of Russia's GDP by 1% would 
reduce remittances inflows to Central Asian countries by 5%.  
Another critical point is that the deepening economic and financial crisis in Russia and 
the collapse of the Russian ruble coinciding with persisting lower oil prices have negatively 
affected CIS remittance-dependent countries, particularly Central Asian countries, resulting 
in high inflation rates. With remittances inflows being slashed in half, the unemployment 
rate soared as a large number of migrant workers lost their jobs and the inflation rate rose 
due to extreme currency depreciation. The Russian ruble hit its lowest value – 82.37 ruble 
per US dollar – for the first time since the currency reform in 1988 (Central Bank of Russia, 
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especially in the sectors of construction and services and other low-skilled industries where 
migrant workers were mainly engaged. 
International remittances have exceeded the other two main financial foreign inflows, 
i.e. foreign direct investment (FDI) and net official development assistance (ODA) in the 
last two decades. In this context, the majority of CIS countries are reliant on remittances 
(Figure 3). By contrast, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are oil exporting 
countries and Belarus is not a remittance-dependent country, and therefore they receive 
higher FDI and ODA inflows rather than remittances. However, other CIS countries 
(Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,) that mostly depend on 
remittances, are showing that remittances are gradually increasing to become much higher 
than ODA and FDI. However, ODA and FDI do exceed remittances in the case of 
Uzbekistan, but we must consider that Uzbekistan receives the highest amount of remittances 
in the CIS region after Ukraine (Central Bank of Russia, 2019).  
We can predict that CIS counties will continue to suffer from Russian economic 
stagnation as long as they are dependent on Russia’s economic health through migrant 
remittances and financial flows. Considering that a large share of remittances contributes to 
GDP, remittance- dependent countries amongst CIS face serious economic risks, as 
governments are having difficulties when trying to find foreign-exchange reserves for 
imports’ current spending. On the other hand, if the Russian economic downturn continues, 
remittance-dependent countries will find themselves facing a set of unprecedented 
challenges because of the possibility of the return of a large number of migrants to a domestic 
labour market that has a more than limited capacity to absorb them. The Guardian (2015) 
reports that a drop in ruble value is not only shrinking the amount sent home by workers 



















Figure 2.3. CIS countries, the level of Remittances, FDI in ratio to GDP, and ODA 





Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2018.  
   
   
   










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4. The empirical model.  
 
Our paper will contribute to two strands of literature. The first strand relates to the 
remittances’ effect on economic growth. The model developed to explore the relationship 
between remittances and economic growth is based on the extended version of the 
neoclassical model (Barro, 1996), which has been used by Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005), 
Jongwanich (2007) and Fayissa and Nsiah (2008). Within this framework, the growth 
equation can be expressed as follows: 
 
lnGDP pcit= β0 + β1 ln REMit + β2ln YearEduit + β3 ln GINIit + β4 ln Infit +
β5 ln Govexit + β6 ln OPNit +  ηi +  εit    (1) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡  is the natural log of real GDP per capita in 𝑖 country at time t and ln 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 
is log of received remittances per capita in US$; 𝛽2 is the log of secondary school enrolment; 
𝛽3 is the log of inequality proxied by GINI coefficient, whilst 𝜂 is an unobserved country-
specific effect and 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Based on Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) and 
Jongwanich (2007), we are going to include in our model as control variables other variables 
such as inflation (𝛽4), government consumption expenditure (𝛽5) and openness to trade (𝛽6).  
The expected sign of the coefficient associated with remittances is ambiguous, as 
suggested by the literature shown in Section 2. The coefficient associated with the secondary 
school enrolment used as a measure of investment in human capital is expected to have a 
positive effect on economic growth (Schultz, 1980; Romer 1986; Lucas, 1987; and Barro, 
1991). 
By contrast, we expect negative coefficients relating to government consumption and 
inflation, suggesting that a high rate of domestic inflation may act as a proxy for uncertainty 
and risk and therefore discourage growth (Gupta et al., 2007; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2005). Government consumption is an approximate measure of government spending in non-
productive purposes so that an increase in this variable tends to generate negative impacts 
on economic growth (Jongwanich, 2007). 
Regarding our set of control variables, openness not only promotes a country’s exports 
and imports, but also stimulates private sector economic activities, attracts foreign 
investment, reduces poverty rate, creates employment and increases foreign earnings. 
Accordingly, we expect a positive relationship between trade openness and economic 
growth. The second strand is the one that links remittances and poverty level. The model 









to assess the role of remittances on poverty reduction is based on Ravallion and Chen (1997), 
Adams and Page (2005), Gupta et al., (2007) and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2010). 
The relationship that we want to estimate can be written as follows:  
 
LogPOVit =  β1log (qit) + β2log(γit) + β3log(Remit) + β4log(Xit) + ai 
εit  , (i = 1, … N;  t = 1, … , T)   (2) 
 
where 𝑃𝑂𝑉 is the measure of poverty 𝑖 country at time t; 𝑎𝑖 is the fixed effect reflecting 
qualitative differences amongst countries. 𝛽1 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
income inequality proxied by the GINI coefficient (q). 𝛽2 is the elasticity of poverty with 
respect to real per capita GDP given (γ). 𝛽3 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
international remittances (𝑅𝑒𝑚). 𝑋 contains the control variables, human capital, inflation, 
government expenditure and openness and   is the error term. 
The dependent variable in Equation 2, which is poverty, will be estimated via three 
poverty measures: poverty headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty. We measured 
poverty rate based on a methodology of Foster et al. (1984) (FGT). According to FGT, 
poverty will basically be measured based on three measures: headcount poverty, poverty gap 
(or poverty depth) and square poverty gap (or poverty severity). The most widely used 
measure is the headcount index, which simply measures the proportion of the population that 
is counted as poor, often denoted by 𝑃0 and described by the following formula,  




     (3) 
where 𝑁𝑝 is the number of poor people and N is the total population. The expression can be 




∑ 𝐼 (𝑦𝑖  < 𝑧)
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (4)   
 
Here, “I (·) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the expression in brackets 
is true, and 0 otherwise. So, if expenditure (𝑦𝑖) is lower than the poverty line (z), then I (·) 
equals 1 and the household would be counted as poor” (Haughton and Khandker, 2009, pp. 
68-69, Chapter 4). 
A moderately popular measure of poverty is the poverty gap index which measures the 
extent to which individuals’ income falls below the poverty line (cost of living in a country) 
as a percentage of the poverty line. The poverty gap index may be written as follows.  


















  (5)  
 
where 𝑁 is the size of sample,  𝐺𝑖 is a poverty gap and 𝑧 is a poverty line.  The measure does 
not reflect changes in inequality amongst the poor, whilst the next measure of poverty i.e. 
Squared poverty gap (or Poverty severity) takes into account inequality amongst the poor 
which formally might be written as: 









  (𝛼 ≥ 0)     (6)  
 
where N is the number of people in the economy, 𝛼 is a measure of the sensitivity of the 
index to poverty, 𝑧 is a poverty line and 𝐺 is poverty gap for individual 𝑖. With α = 0, 𝑃0 is 
simply the headcount poverty index. With α = 1, the index is the poverty gap index 𝑃1, and 
when α is set equal to 2, 𝑃2 is the poverty severity index (Foster et al., 1984).  
The coefficient of our variables of interest β3 could be positive or negative and we are 
interested in testing whether remittances’ impact on poverty reduction is statistically 
significant. The model assumes that the level of income inequality is associated with a higher 
poverty level so that economic growth reduces poverty more in low-inequality countries than 
amongst high-inequality countries, therefore the coefficient of 𝛽1 is expected to be positive. 
Past work has shown that a worsening income distribution tends to have a negative impact 
on poverty reduction, so its coefficient is expected to be positive.  
Moreover, the model assumes that economic growth will reduce the poverty level; 
therefore, the coefficient of our variables of interest 𝛽2 is expected to be negative. The 
literature shows that a rise in human capital increases the opportunity of the poor to generate 
income (Jongwanich, 2007) and increase labour productivity and wages (Anyanwu 2010), 
so the coefficient associated with human capital is expected to be positive, whereas the sign 
of the coefficient corresponding to trade openness is ambiguous. 
Some of the literature argues that trade liberalization benefits the poor at least as much 
as it benefits the average person (Jongwanich, 2007). Trade liberalization could increase the 
relative wage of low-skilled workers and reduce monopoly rents as well as the value of 
connections to bureaucratic and political power. Nevertheless, Jongwanich (2007) states that 
trade liberalization might also worsen the income distribution, particularly by encouraging 
the adoption of skill-biased technical change in response to increased foreign competition. 









Thus, if trade liberalization worsens the income distribution enough, particularly by making 
the poor poorer, then it is possible that it does not reduce poverty, despite its positive overall 
growth effects. Indeed, the empirical evidence from the large and growing literature on trade 
and growth remains mixed (Edwards, 1998; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). Edwards (1998) 
conducted a survey of empirical literature and as a result, defended the positive effect of 
openness on economic growth and claimed that the trade-growth nexus was not only robust 
to the indicators of openness but also to functional forms, estimation techniques and periods, 




5. Variables and data used in the analysis. 
 
We use cross-country data to analyse the effect of remittances on per capita GDP and 
poverty reduction of CIS countries. This paper investigates 10 selected CIS countries for the 
period 1998–2016, using 190 observations. We test our hypothesis with the help of random-
effect, fixed-effects, least square models (OLS) with and without instrumental variables. 
Despite the difficulty of obtaining remittances’ data, we can benefit from access to the 
World Bank database. Data on remittances’ transfers of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are 
available on the website of the Central Bank of Russia and International Statistic Committee 
of CIS countries.  
  
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
l_GDPpc 7.25 7.16 0.959 4.94 9.03 
l_REM 19.5 19.6 1.90 13.9 22.9 
l_OPN 4.56 4.63 0.315 3.60 5.30 
l_POV 5.46 3.72 5.10 -4.61 10.7 
l_PVG 5.51 9.76 6.02 -4.61 10.8 
l_SPV 5.79 9.71 5.86 -4.61 10.8 
l_GINI 3.94 4.22 0.969 0.00 4.96 
l_YearEdu 3.45 3.81 1.09 0.00 4.54 
l_GovExp 4.23 4.53 0.947 0.00 5.20 
l_Inflation 2.03 2.05 1.06 -0.864 5.68 
 
Note: Raw data after a log transformation.  

















GDP pc Natural log of real GDP per capita  
World Banks’ WDI 
IMF-DOT 
Remittances Personal remittances, received (current US$) +/- 
World Banks’ WDI 
Central Bank of 
Russia 
Trade openness 
Ratio of the sum of imports and exports to the GDP 
that gives the measure of openness of an economy 
+/- World Bank’s WDI 
Poverty gap 
Poverty gap index measures the extent to which 
individuals fall below the poverty line as a 
proportion of the poverty line 
- World Bank’s WDI 
Squared poverty 
gap 
Squared poverty gap index determines the log 
degree of poverty for a given area 
- World Bank’s WDI 
Poverty 
headcount 
The log headcount index measures the proportion of 
the log of population that is poor and lives below the 









The standard measure of income inequality based on 
a Lorenz Curve that ranges from 0 (or 0%) to 1 (or 
100%), with 0 representing perfect equality and 1 
representing perfect inequality. Values over 1 are 
theoretically possible due to negative income or 
wealth 
-/+ World Bank’s WDI 
Inflation Annual Percentage change in CPI - 





Log of secondary school enrolment (in percentage) 
used as a proxy for the measure of investment in 
human capital 
-/+ 
Barro and Lee (2011) 




Government size  
General government final consumption expenditure 
(% of GDP) 




Table 2.3. Bivariate correlations of regression variables. 
 
Note: Raw data after a log transformation. 









6. Empirical results. 
 
Table 4 shows the results when Equation (1) is estimated using Model 1 (OLS), Model 
2 (Fixed-Effects Model) and Model 3 (Random Effects Model). The log transformation of 
all the variables allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. 
The results reveal that the relationship between the GDP per capita and the explanatory 
variables, representing the sources of growth, show the expected signs, according to our prior 
prediction. The results from our model specify that the remittances variable has a positive 
and statistically significant effect at 5% and 10% on the GDP per capita. We found that, on 
an average, a 1 percentage point increase in remittances would provoke a 0.21% to 0.29% 
increase in the average per capita GDP of a CIS economy. 
The negative coefficient associated with openness is statistically significant only in the 
first and second models at 1%. As we mentioned in Section 4, a higher degree of international 
integration of the real sector makes the export of labour forces – which is a precondition for 
remittances – less attractive (Berg and Krueger, 2003). 
 





















































R-squared 0.610712   
Adj. R-squared 0.564913   
Log-likelihood −101.5105  −143.5550 
Sum squared resid   64.70789 
LSDV R-squared  0.628203  
Within R-squared  0.286536  
Num. obs. 115 115 138 
Note: All variables are in logarithm formula. T-statistics are reported in parentheses with *, **, *** 
denoting significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 









Note that other controlling variables, i.e. inflation, income inequality and human 
capital reach the theoretical expected signs although they are not statistically significant. In 
particular, Stahl (1982) argues that remittances could induce income inequality. Jongwanich 
(2007, pp. 5–10) states that “because the international migration can be an expensive venture 
so that it is going to be the better-off households who will be more capable of producing 
migration and sending remittances”.  
 




Poverty headcount Poverty gap Squared poverty gap 








































































































































































     
     
R-squared 0.517767   0.500673   0.697406   
Adj. R-
squared 








 109.0826 79.76943  2021.319  911.1899 1858.235 869.5673 
Within R-
squared 
  0.382939   0.524591    0.681792 
Num. obs. 115 124 115 83 88 83 86 94 86 
 
Note: All variables are in logarithm formula. t-statistics are reported in parentheses with *, **, *** denoting significance at 1, 5, 
and 10%, respectively. 









The coefficient of government consumption specifies that government expenditure 
does impact significantly on economic growth. In contrast, an increase in inflation tends to 
retard economic growth, confirming the expected sign. 
Table 2.5. reports the results regarding the impact of remittances on poverty reduction 
amongst CIS countries (equation 2 is estimated using the above-mentioned three models). 
There is a long relationship between remittances and poverty reduction in CIS 
countries. Remittances are not usually very volatile and seem to depend to a certain degree 
on prior levels of remittances. Therefore, to account for this persistence, a lagged remittance 
value has been included in the model. 
Remittances are found to have a significant impact on the poverty headcount and the 
square poverty gap. We found that, on average, an increase in remittances by 1% leads to a 
reduction in poverty headcount from 0.21 to 0.24%. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that 
remittances will have a slightly larger impact on poverty when this is measured by more 
sensitive poverty measures: poverty gap and squared poverty gap. It shows that on overage, 
a 1% increase in remittances will lead from 0.66 to 0.96% decline in the share of people 
living in poverty gap, although results are not statistically significant, and from 1.81 to 1.98 
% decline in the share of people living in squared poverty gap.  
The results reveal that, regardless of the measure of poverty used as the dependent 
variable, GDP per capita has a negative and significant coefficient (the coefficient ranges 
from -0.31 to -8.3). Other controlling variables, i.e. income inequality, openness, inflation, 
human capital and government expenditure, reach the theoretical expected signs although 
some of them are not statistically significant. A positive coefficient for the GINI index, 
although it is not statistically significant, points out that higher inequality leads to higher 
poverty. Surprisingly, our results suggest that inequality reduction does not play a key role 
in scaling down poverty levels. 
 
7. Conclusion and further research. 
 
The main goal of this paper is to assess the effect of remittances on economic growth 
and poverty reduction amongst CIS countries.  
This study gives insights into two important channels through which remittances do 
positively affect economic growth and do negatively affect poverty amongst CIS countries. 
All variables we included in our two equations reach the theoretically expected sign and 









statistical significance and confirm the hypotheses put forward in the beginning of the paper. 
In particular, we must highlight two key findings from this paper. Firstly, remittances seem 
to have a slightly positive and significant impact on economic growth amongst CIS 
countries. Secondly, the lagged value of remittances seems to have a significant impact on 
the poverty headcount and the squared poverty gap. 
We should also mention that, although remittances contribute significantly to the 
overall economy, we should not regard them as the main source of development. More 
remittances inflows leads to more people migrating abroad as they enjoy higher wage-
earning opportunities in labour-receiving countries, and therefore, this may have detrimental 
effects, such as less government spending on welfare, fewer or no institutional reforms, 
moral hazard and/or brain drain. Governments in remittance-receiving countries should seek 
to break the cycle of remittance dependency by ensuring good welfare coverage and a secure 
investment climate. The promotion of remittances should only be one part of any country’s 
development strategy. CIS countries ought to attempt to use a more rational way of investing 
remittance inflows in dynamic productive sectors such as education, physical and human 
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A1. CIS countries: variables charts after the log transformation, 2000-2015. 
 
 



















3.3. Patterns of Official Development Assistance in Tajikistan: effects 




The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of official development assistance on economic 
growth and poverty reduction in Tajikistan, as well as to examine the recent role of South-
South Cooperation. We used a panel data set on economic growth and poverty 
estimates in Tajikistan, and found that a 1% increase of official development 
assistance provoked a 1.6% rise in per capita GDP and a 0.48% decrease in poverty 
levels in Tajikistan. Despite the increased relevance of South-South Cooperation in 
Tajikistan, the current bilateral cooperation pattern does not allow us to think South–
South aid will create employment and growth opportunities. 
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1. Introduction  
 
It is nearly fifty years since foreign official development assistance became one of the 
main factors of economic growth among developing countries. A 1970 resolution approved 
by the United Nations General Assembly (UN 1970, paragraph 43) specified that rich 
countries should aim to donate 0.7% of gross national product (GNP) to poor countries in 
the form of official development assistance (ODA). As ODA did not reach GNP 0.7% on 
average, the United Nations (2015) suggested several positive effects, from the perspective 
of developing countries, from 1990 until 2015. ODA has reduced global extreme poverty in 
56.6%, increased children enrollment in primary education from 83% to 91%, improved 
health conditions regarding, for instance, HIV/AIDS, improved environmental sustainability 
as well as reduced child mortality from 90 to 43 deaths per 1000 between 1990 and 2015. 
The volume of ODA has increased drastically over the recent decades: the total value of 
aid disbursed to developing countries has multiplied 3.6 times, i.e. from US$ 33,7 billion in 
1960 to US$ 157,6 billion in 2017 (World Bank, 2017).  
However, empirical evidence regarding the role of foreign aid in the growth process 
among developing countries shows mixed results, as it will be shown later, and hence new 
empirical case studies are still needed to clarify this issue. This controversy coincides with 
the upsurge of some emerging countries such as China, Russia or Turkey as donors, 
especially regarding their area of influence or among countries well-endowed with raw 
materials. 
Although developed countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) continue to be the 
main source of international aid, the share of non-DAC contributors has been rising, 
especially from middle-income developing countries such as China through the so-called 
South-South Cooperation channel. Until the collapse of the USSR, international cooperation 
between China and Central Asian countries was insignificant and, once Central Asian 
countries became independent, China improved its contacts and actively set its bilateral 
relations with these countries, including Tajikistan (Kessenova, 2009).  
South-South Cooperation plays an important role in international development 
cooperation. Its main principles are non-interference in internal affairs, equality among 
developing partners and respect for their independence, national sovereignty, cultural 
diversity and identity and local content (Padilla, 2010). There are some reasons why Chinese 









development assistance has proved to be more effective than OECD/DAC aid. For instance, 
there is a lack of conditionality for Chinese development assistance, whereas DAC donors 
demand reforms among recipient countries in return for aid (Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, August 2003). Bossuyt (2015) claims that, with the exception of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, receptiveness to EU’s aid is low, mostly because it involves political 
conditionality and interference in domestic affairs. However, a number of experts asserted 
that some recipient countries are concerned with the mixed effect of Chinese development 
assistance. For instance, local companies are endangered because Chinese firms bring labour 
with them, therefore few jobs are created and no technology transfer takes place (Chin and 
Frolic, 2007). In this regard, the Chinese labor policy leads to a paradox in the case of the 
Tajik economy, because Tajik workers migrate to Russia whereas Chinese workers occupy 
jobs in construction projects and land farming in Tajikistan. 
Whereas a large number of studies have examined the effects of aid among African 
countries, there is no literature discussing aid’s effects for Tajikistan. Tajikistan has been 
selected as the best case study since this country has received a considerable amount of 
development assistance from China (as a Central Asian country neighbour of China). The 
total amount of China’s development assistance to Tajikistan reached around US$ 1.8 billion 
from 2005 to 2017 (ASPRT, 2017). Although, the amount of China’s development assistance 
to foreign countries is remarkable increasing, however the Chinese government does not 
publish reports providing consolidated information on foreign aid. Chinese officials are 
generally unwilling to reveal either the geographical or sectoral distribution of disbursements 
(Chin and Frolic, 2007).  
Tajikistan case is the best example for the interpretation of South-South cooperation, as 
a former Soviet Republic that can theoretically enjoy from both Russian and Chinese aid. 
Therefore, in this paper we analyse the main features of the ODA flows recently received in 
Tajikistan, in order not only to infer conclusions about the nature of Tajik aid, but also to 
suggest policy recommendations for EU as well as OECD countries regarding ODA 
effectiveness. 
The main objective of this research is to analyse aid effects on growth and poverty 
reduction using a time series methodology (employing annual data from 1998 to 2016 for 
the Tajik economy). It is too soon to examine whether the South-South Cooperation effect 
will be more effective for economic growth and poverty reduction; however, it is still 
essential to evaluate the recent role played by ODA from OECD/DAC countries. 









We attempt to assess the effect of ODA on economic growth and poverty reduction in 
Tajikistan with the purpose of testing the following hypotheses: 
H1: The volume of foreign aid is associated with a higher standard of living (higher per 
capita GDP).  
H2: Foreign aid has been able to reduce poverty levels among recipient countries. 
H3: In case South-South cooperation upsurge has already become a reality, it will 
improve the standard of living of the population of aid receiving countries 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature 
survey. Section 3 discusses the basic features of ODA in Tajikistan, whereas Section 4 
presents the specification of the applied model. Section 5 discusses the econometric 
estimation and the expected signs of the utilised variables. Sections 6, 7, and 8 present 
empirical results regarding the effect of ODA on per capita GDP levels and poverty 
reduction. The final section concludes the paper and suggests some policy implications. 
 
 
2.  Literature review about ODA effects on growth and poverty reduction  
 
The empirical literature has failed to produce conclusive evidence regarding the relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth or poverty reduction among developing countries. 
In a pioneering paper, Chenery and Strout (1966: 463-466), using a Two-Gap model 
(Investment-Saving and Import-Export), stated that investment is the main factor of 
economic growth, the one which increases output and per capita income. In addition, they 
noted that 'the required investment depends on domestic savings, but if domestic savings are 
lower than the required investment then foreign assistance could fill that gap'. 
In an attempt to prove this theory empirically, Papanek (1973), using a cross-country 
analysis for 34 countries in the 1950s and 51 countries in the 1960s, provided the first study 
to disaggregate foreign capital flows into foreign aid, foreign investment and other flows. 
They found that foreign aid had the greater effect over growth in comparison with foreign 
direct investment, other foreign capital inflows and domestic savings.  
Much later and, once foreign aid had been generalised among developing countries, 
Hansen and Tarp (2000: 4), in a cross-country regression analysis of 72 countries that 
estimated the relation between aid and economic growth, revealed that 40 of those 72 
countries showed a positive correlation of aid and growth, whereas 32 countries did not.  









Among aid supporters, Morrissey (2001: 41-42) concluded that the upward trend of 
global ODA does contribute to developing countries’ economic growth. He expressed that 
“aid increases investment in physical and human capital, increases the capacity to import 
capital goods or technology, does not have indirect effects that reduce investments or savings 
rates, and aid is associated with technology transfers that increase the productivity of capital 
and promote endogenous technical change”. Gomanee et al. (2005), using a sample of 25 
Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1970 to 1997, suggest that aid has a direct 
effect on economic growth. They emphasise that, on average, each percentage point increase 
in the aid/GNP ratio leads to an increase in the growth rate from 0.5 to 1 percentage point. 
Karras (2006), using panel data for 71 aid-receiving countries over the period 1960 to 
1997, proposed a positive effect of foreign aid on economic growth without considering the 
impact of policies. He concluded that a permanent increase in foreign aid by $20 per person 
provokes a permanent increase in the growth of real GDP per capita by 0.16%. More 
recently, Adams and Atsu (2014) utilised Ghana’s annual data over the period 1970-2011 to 
demonstrate that aid exerted a positive short-term relationship with that country’s economic 
growth. 
Recent claims regarding the complete uselessness of ODA have been neglected by some 
authors, reminding that despite controversy, ODA has had very positive effects on 
developing countries (Radelet, 2017). 
However, a number of experts claim that ODA does not provide receiving countries 
with a stable platform to grow sustainably. For instance, Mosley et al. (1987), applying 
various estimation techniques for 63 countries covering the period 1970–1980, claimed that 
there is no relationship between aid and economic growth.  
Cassen and Associates (1994: 15–16) report that empirical studies on the correlation 
between aid and economic growth are ambiguous: ’research on the macroeconomic effects 
of aid deals with relatively large groups of developing countries. Its results are ambiguous. 
The relationship between aid and growth is rather weak: it can be either positive or negative, 
depending on the country groupings and the time period chosen…’  
Additionally, a part of the literature has pointed out some conditions that must be fulfilled 
in order to guarantee the above-mentioned positive effect of aid on growth. Governance 
quality is one of the conditions that has emerged as the key to sustainable human 
development in recent years. Overall, the central importance of good policies and institutions 
in maximising the effectiveness of aid has been strongly confirmed in many studies. 









Quite early, Dowling and Hiemenz (1982), using panel data for Asian countries over the 
period 1970 to 1978, found strong evidence that foreign aid flows are positively associated 
with higher growth rates in recipient countries. Moreover, these authors stated that good 
institutions and open trade have a positive correlation with GDP growth through the 
allocation and mobilisation of foreign resources.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000), using a neoclassical growth model in which the interaction 
of aid and a policy index variable was analysed, examined 56 countries over six time periods 
spanning from 1970 to 1993. They discovered that the interaction of aid and institutional 
quality exerts a robust positive effect on growth. Further, they stated that 'a corrupt, 
incompetent government is not going to use aid wisely and outside donors are not going to 
be able to force it to change its habits' (Burnside and Dollar, 2000: 2). However, Easterly et 
al. (2004) assessed the Burnside and Dollar (2000) model by using alternative definitions of 
aid, finding that the aid-interaction term is statistically insignificant. They used the same 
model specification, econometric techniques, and data applied by Burnside and Dollar, 
extending data over four additional years; however, the interactive term remained 
statistically insignificant. 
According to the World Bank (1998), there is a demonstrated relationship between aid 
effectiveness and good governance. The main conclusion of the World Bank’s report was 
that aid allocation should be channelled to recipient countries selected according to their 
policy environment. On a similar note, Princeton Survey Research Associates (2003) 
conducted a survey commissioned by the World Bank, which showed that 84% of opinion 
makers concluded that, because of corruption, foreign assistance to developing counties is 
mostly wasted in Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Quite recently, Colley and Heathershaw (2018: 3) inform us that “governments in 
Central Asia are very much connected with the outside world, and that greater connectivity 
actually exacerbates the region’s problems with weak governance and corruption. Since 
becoming independent states, governments in Central Asia have been quite adept at 
navigating the liberal political and economic order beyond their borders to promote their 
self-enrichment and self-preservation”. In other words, as expressed by Darden (2008), 
corruption has become a source of stability for authoritarian regimes in many post-Soviet 
states.  
Overall, the central importance of good policies and institutions in maximizing the 
effectiveness of aid has been strongly confirmed in the existing literature. However, some 









empirical papers deny the positive impact of ODA on the macroeconomic performance of 
recipient countries. 
Several decades ago, Mosley (1980) made an important contribution to the literature 
by incorporating lagged aid variables into his model, what helped him conclude that there is 
no statistically significant correlation between aid and economic growth. According to 
Mosley (1987: 139), 'there appears to be no statistically significant correlation in any post-
war period, either positive or negative, between inflows of development aid and the growth 
rate of GNP amongst developing countries when other causal influences on growth are taken 
into account'. Recently, Mallik (2008), using co-integration analysis, found that aid has no 
significant effect on growth in the short run, whereas there is a significant negative 
relationship between aid and growth in the long run in 5 of the 6 African poorest countries. 
The World Bank (1998) assessing the the articles by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Collier and Dollar (2002) asserted that the correlation between aid and poverty reduction 
would only be seen under the two following conditions: (a) a large share of the population 
living in poverty and (b) good fiscal policies. In a similar vein, Easterly et al. (2003) 
suggested that aid reduces poverty when the quality of institutions is good enough to 
efficiently allocate aid funds in receiving countries.  
Regarding attempts to measure ODA effectiveness at reducing poverty, Addison et 
al. (2005), using panel data for 23 African aid recipient countries from 1960 to 2002, 
concluded that aid promotes growth and reduces poverty. Recently Ravallion (2016: 519) 
argued that 'foreign aid is a phenomenal investment and it does not simply save lives but it 
also lays the groundwork for lasting, long-term economic progress'. On the other side of the 
debate, anti-foreign aid opinions are equally strong. On this view, foreign aid tends to reduce 
poverty in recipient countries only when governance quality is also improved. For instance, 
Arvin & Barillas (2002) tested the causal relationship among aid, democracy, and poverty 
using data from 118 countries over the period 1971 to 2002, concluding that, conditional on 
the state of democracy, there is no significant causal relationship between aid and poverty. 
Ijaiya and Ijaiya (2004) analysing 39 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990 to 
2004, found that a poor level of institutional quality does not allow foreign aid to reduce 
poverty levels significantly in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
From the above listed review of empirical studies, it is quite clear that aid may not 
always be successful in promoting economic growth and poverty reduction. A good 
institutional environment has been considered an important determinant in the development 









process, since better government institutions are linked with both economic growth and 
poverty reduction among recipient countries. 
 
 
3.  Patterns of Aid Inflows into the Tajik Economy: the role of emerging 
countries as ODA donors  
 
Although Tajikistan has achieved a relative political stability and macroeconomic 
indicators of the country have improved since the end of Tajik Civil War in 1997, the levels 
of poverty, external debt, and the size of the shadow economy are a continuous and serious 
concern. Sometimes Tajikistan has been regarded as the poorest Central Asian nation, whose 
particular struggle against severe poverty has already been described by the literature 
(Falkingham, 2000). In spite of the poor level of institutional quality in Tajikistan, donor 
countries provide aid to Tajikistan through embassies, agencies for cooperation and 
development, banks, and other government agencies in multilateral and bilateral channels. 
The main providers of multilateral aid are still the OECD countries; with regard to the 
bilateral aid channel, China in particular plays the most relevant role. While Western donor 
activities used the terms “development aid” and “development assistances”, the Chinese 
government does not have an official definition of what constitutes development aid and 
Chinese prefer the terms “South-South cooperation” and “strategic partnership” featuring 
the political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural 
exchanges (FOCAC, Forum for China-Africa Cooperation 2006). Regarding China’s role in 
international cooperation, many projects of different nature have recently been launched, but 
mainly among African countries, which still seem to be the main interest for Chinese 
authorities’ donations (Huang et al. 2018).  
Gulrajani (2016) argues that bilateral channels are more politicised, whereas 
multilateral channels are better suppliers of global public goods. However, the scenario is 
quite different in Tajikistan in this regard. Multilateral aid delivery to Tajikistan has mainly 
been channelled to budget support, technical assistance (project approach) and support to 
civil society and non-state actors (Agency on Statistics under the President of the Republic 
of Tajikistan [ASPRT], 2016). These funds are targeted to sectorial programmes, mostly 
focusing on poverty alleviation, health, and pensions. The European Union External Action 









Report (2016) stated that multilateral aid policy gives priority in Tajikistan to promoting 
human rights, democracy, the rule of law, access to justice for the civil society, protection 
of the environment and, as well, the fight against HIV/AIDS. 
According to the report provided by the ASPRT (2016), the total annual volume of 
multilateral aid to Tajikistan continually increased since 2002, until it reached its peak in 
2010 at US$ 157.30 million. Bilateral aid reached its peak in 2015 at US$ 448.96 million. A 
reduction of the annual volume of bilateral foreign aid of 6.8% took place between 2009 and 
2013, predominantly due to the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 and the ongoing 
financial crisis started from 2015 among CIS countries. 
Figure 3.1 indicates that the total amount of assistance from donor countries through 




Source: United Nations Development Programme UNDP Foreign Aid Report, 2014; ASPRT, 2017 
 
 
The reduction of ODA volume by OECD has promoted China to become the main provider 
of development assistance to Tajikistan. Aid flowing from China sharply increased from 
2007 to 2015. The total development assistance provided by China amounted to US$ 




















Figure 3.1. Volume of aid provided by OECD (multilateral) 
and China (bilateral) to Tajikistan during 2002–2016
OECD/DAC CHINA









came from China. However, we have to consider that China does not take part in multilateral 
organizations’ aid, with the exception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which 
focused on Chinese-Russian-Central Asian ties. Nevertheless, such assistance has not 
provided a relevant amount of resources to Asian countries. 
During the 2002–2016 period, total aid, either through multilateral or bilateral 
channels, amounted to US$ 3.294.783 million (ASPRT, 2016), of which only US$ 119.62 
million was provided by Muslim majority countries. Russia provided US$ 67.8 million 
during 2002–2016. Thus, we set Figure 3.3 once again, to test our third hypothesis regarding 
the contribution of emerging countries and South-South Cooperation to Tajikistan from 2002 
to 2016. 
Figure 3.3 shows that China has become an important provider of aid to Tajikistan, 
starting in 2007. The total aid provided by Muslim majority countries and Russia constitutes 
only 7.1% of the total aid provided by China during 2002–2016. During the period 2007–
2011, the volume of aid provided by Muslim majority countries decreased, predominantly 
 
Figure 3.2. The volume of bilateral aid by donor countries to Tajikistan in 2016 
 
Source: UNDP, 2014; ASPRT 2016 
































Figure 3.3. The total bilateral aid provided by Russia, Muslim 
countries, and China to Tajikistan during 2002–2016 (in %) 
 
 
Source: UNDP, 2015; ASPRT 2017 
Note: List of Muslim majority countries providing ODA to Tajikistan are Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.    
 
 due to the global financial and economic crisis in 2007. The share of Muslim majority 
countries was remarkable from 2002 to 200633, i.e. until the beginning of the Arab Spring in 
the Middle East and North African regions. 
Regarding the channel through which Chinese aid has been conceded, the majority of 
it has been delivered in the form of loans: the amount borrowed by Tajikistan from China 
for different government investments reaches around $1.5 billion, a figure around one half 
of total public debt (Ibrahimova, 2019). Only recently, and belonging to China’s Belt and 
Road initiative, China has given as a grant an amount of $360 million to upgrade the highway 
from Kulob to Bokhtar. This amount could be considered as a freebie, but always considering 
that Chinese gifts conceal certain conditions as mining concessions,34 tax exemption for 
Chinese firms or even, as in Tajikistan case, donation of agricultural land (Hofman, 2019). 
                                                 
33 Such changes of policy could be explained in reference to the Justice and Development Party’s 2002 
electoral victory and subsequent policy changes in Ankara, or due to changes within Central Asian states, for 
example related to the Uzbek Government’s suspicion of Turkish intentions in Central Asian countries 
(Thomas Wheeler, 2013).  
 
34 Xinjiang-based company TBEA received a tax exemption for the machinery brought from China aimed at 
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According to Hofman (2015) “the Tajik establishment has turned towards China, rather than 
Iran, Russia, or Europe”. These loans or grants conceded by Chinese authorities, according 
to many authors, are not permitting a genuine development for Tajikistan, but on the contrary 
could provoke a higher dependency on imports from China (45% of Tajik imports come 
from China) once the Belt and Road initiative is completed (Karrar and Mostowlansky, 
2020). As mentioned before there is a collusion between Chinese firms’ and Tajikistan’s 
elite interests (Colley and Heathershaw, 2018), which will obstacle Tajikistan development 
due to commercial dependency, higher public indebtedness and resource extraction by elites. 
In consequence, the win-win outcome of the so-called South-South cooperation can certainly 
be questioned. 
Although Figure 3.6 highlights the noticeable share of aid from Muslim majority 
countries and Russia during 2003–2006, the total aid provided by these countries within that 
period is equal to 38.4% of that provided by China in 2007. Total aid provided by Muslim 
majority countries and Russia amounted at US$ 85.7 million from 2002 to 2006, whereas 
the Chinese share totalled $223.31 million only in 2007. During 2012 and 2013, the total aid 
provided by Muslim majority countries totalled $193.79 million and $131.49 million 
whereas, in the same period, the Chinese share totalled at $276.24 million and $421.58 
million. 
The average volume of aid provided by China in the last ten years was US$ 130,6 
million, while Muslim majority countries and Russia’s share amounted at US$ 67.6 million 
and US$ 91.4 million, respectively. Furthermore, Russia has not provided aid to Tajikistan 
in 2011, 2014, and 2016.  
Despite the fact that financial South-South Cooperation to Tajikistan is channelled 
mainly through loans and less through grants, South-South Cooperation already plays a 
crucial role in the field of international development assistance to Tajikistan far beyond what 
OECD and emerging countries can offer. The role of DAC countries is remarkable after 
China, while Muslim majority countries’ share is smaller; Russia plays barely any role in 
this regard. 
However, although the money invested in Tajikistan is creating infrastructures and 
accumulating capital in some sectors such as mining or energy generation, the South–South 
cooperation is surely providing more benefits for lending countries and elites than providing 
better job opportunities for the Tajik population. As a result of this, the “win-win” or “mutual 









gains” narrative corresponding to South-South cooperation should be nuanced. Therefore, 
we would reject the hypothesis 3 put forward in the introduction. 
 
 
4.  Methodological procedure 
 
This section discusses the specifications of a model aimed at examining the relationship, 
firstly, between foreign aid and per capita GDP growth and, secondly, between aid and 
poverty reduction. Following the basic neoclassical growth model by Solow (1956) our 
specification can be written as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐴𝑡  𝐾
𝑎
𝑡 (𝐻𝐶𝑡𝐿𝑡 ) 𝛽 … (1) 
 
where 𝑌 is gross domestic product (𝐺𝐷𝑃) in real terms; 𝐿 and 𝐾 denote, respectively, labour 
(employment) and physical capital inputs, 𝐴 is a measure of technology and exogenous 
knowledge; 𝑎 is the share of capital; β is the share of labour (participation ratio), while 𝑡 
represents time. We linearise (1), taking logs and differencing, obtaining the following 
expression that describes the determinants of the growth rate of real 𝐺𝐷𝑃: 
𝐼𝑛 𝑌𝑡 =  𝑎 ln(𝐾𝑡 ) + 𝛽 n(𝐿𝑡 ) + ln(𝐻𝑡 ) + ln(𝐴𝑡 ) … (2) 
 
Taking into account the objective of researching the effect of aid on economic 
growth, the aggregate capital can be divided into domestic and foreign capital in the form of 
aid. In addition to this, the variables that conventionally appear in economic growth models 
such as institutional quality (level of corruption), openness to trade, average years of 
schooling. The ODA inflow in ratio to GDP and the Gini coefficient have also been included 
(Barro and Lee, 1994). Applying these changes to equation 2, the final model will be 
rewritten as follows:  
 
𝐼𝑛 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 +   𝛽1 ln(𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 ln(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡  ) + 𝛽3 ln(𝐺𝐸𝑡 )  + 𝛽4 ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑐𝑡 )
+ 𝛽5 ln(𝐿𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝛽6 ln(𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑐𝑡 ) + 𝛽7 ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 ) + 𝑡                     (3) 
 
As shown by the first hypothesis put forward, we expect that 𝛽1 (aid inflow) is positive. 
Furthermore, we expect a positive effect of 𝛽2 (average years of schooling) and 𝛽5  (labour 









force) since a higher human capital accumulation and a higher level of education leads to a 
higher growth potential. We also expect a negative value for 𝛽4 (level of corruption). Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1995) also argue that government consumption is a proxy of political 
corruption and other undesirable government aspects. It is also widely argued that the 
openness (𝛽6) effect on growth is theoretically ambiguous. Edwards (1992) state that 
openness to trade might have a positive impact on economic growth primarily by facilitating 
technological spillovers, which, in turn, would increase productivity, international 
competitiveness, and export revenues. On the contrary, Vlastou (2010) claimed that 
openness might have a negative impact on growth, particularly in the case of low-income 
developing countries. 
The parameter 𝛽7 (income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient) is the elasticity 
of GDP with respect to income inequality, and  − a disturbance term which is assumed to 
be normally distributed. The 𝛽 coefficients of the explanatory variables, excluding the 
dummy variable, reflect the elasticity of the real GDP with respect to each of these variables.  
According to Foster et al. (1984), poverty can basically be measured based on three 
measures: headcount poverty, poverty gap (or poverty depth) and square poverty gap (or 
poverty severity). The most widely used measure is the headcount index, which simply 
measures the proportion of the population that is registered as poor, often denoted by 𝑃0 and 




  (4) 
 
where 𝑁𝑝 is the number of poor people and N is the total population. The expression can be 





∑ 𝐼 (𝑦𝑖  < 𝑧)
𝑁
𝑖=1
  (5) 
 
Here, “I (·) is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if the expression in brackets 
is true, and 0 otherwise. So, if expenditure (𝑦𝑖) is lower than the poverty line (z), then I (·) 
equals 1 and the household would be counted as poor” (Haughton and Khandker, 2009, pp. 
68-69, Chapter 4). 
A moderately popular measure of poverty is the poverty gap index, which measures 
the extent to which individuals’ income falls below the poverty line (cost of living in a 























where 𝑁 is the size of sample,  𝐺𝑖 is a poverty gap and 𝑧 is a poverty line.  The measure does 
not reflect changes in inequality amongst the poor, whilst the next measure of poverty i.e. 
Squared poverty gap (or Poverty severity) takes into account inequality amongst the poor 










  (𝛼 ≥ 0) (7) 
 
where N is the number of people in the economy, 𝛼 is a measure of the sensitivity of the 
index to poverty, 𝑧 is a poverty line and 𝐺 is poverty gap for individual 𝑖. With α = 0, 𝑃0 is 
simply the headcount poverty index. With α = 1, the index is the poverty gap index 𝑃1, and 
when α is set equal to 2, 𝑃2 is the poverty severity index (Foster et al., 1984).  
In an effort to examine the relationship between ODA and poverty reduction, we follow 
the primary linear model form suggested by Ravallion (1997). The relationship can be 
written as follows:  
ln 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎1 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(𝑔𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(𝑋𝑖𝑡)  +𝜀𝑖𝑡    
εit  , (i = 1, … N;  t = 1, … , T)   (8) 
 
where 'c' and 't' denote country and time, respectively; 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of poverty 
(headcount) index in country i at time t; and a1 is a fixed effect reflecting qualitative 
differences among countries. 𝛽1 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to income inequality 
measured by the Gini coefficient, g; 𝛽2 is the elasticity of poverty with respect to real per 
capita GDP given by y. Moreover, X is a set of policies and institutional variables that affect 
poverty. As Mosley et al. (1987) suggested, the indirect effects of aid on poverty could be 
channelled through appropriate policies and institutions. 
Equation (8) will be modified to reflect the peculiarity of our study, choosing variables 
following a pattern similar to Equation (3). 









Applying these changes to equation 8, the final model can be rewritten as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln(𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 ) +  𝛽2 ln(𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽3 ln(𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 )  +
𝛽5 ln(𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑐𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽6 ln(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝑖𝑡   (9)  
 
Based on economic theory, a prior expectation is that the ODA effect on poverty level 
is negative. However, a number of studies (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000) claim that the 
effect on poverty could be ambiguous conditional on institutional quality among recipient 
countries. Thus, the model has to be extended, including an interactive regressor (i.e. level 
of corruption), therefore, the sign of coefficient depending from the level of corruption in 
Tajikistan that would be found out after investigation. 
Previous studies (Barro, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010) overwhelmingly 
concluded that bad governance (𝛽2) and greater initial income inequality (𝛽6) provoke 
poverty, even after controlling for initial levels of GDP (Ravallion, 1997; Knowles, 2001). 
Moreover, past studies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) concluded that 
trade openness (𝛽5) is seen as one of the main engines that would foster the needed 
technological progress when there are good economic policies and a supportive institutional 
environment. It makes it possible for poor countries to access intermediate inputs and 
technological transfers from more advanced countries promoting exports, generating 
positive spillovers through exploiting scale economies and encouraging competitiveness and 
efficiency, in consequence, reducing poverty levels (Balassa, 1978; Rodrik 1999). 
Accordingly, the coefficient of the average years of schooling variable (𝛽3) is expected 
to register a negative sign (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). Similarly, we expect the 
negative sign from (𝛽4) because of opportunities for corruption in the disbursement of funds 




















Table 3.1. Variables, measures and data sources. 
 
Variable Measurement Data source 
L_GDPpc Natural logarithm of GDP per capita 
World Development Indicators 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
L_ODAGDP 
Natural logarithm of real 
total net official 
development assistance in ratio to 
GDP 
World Development Indicator 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
L_POV 
The log headcount index measures 
the proportion of the log of 
population that is poor and lives 
below the poverty line 
World Development Indicator 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
Millennium Indicators Databases 
L_GINI 
The standard measure of income 
inequality based on Lorenz Curve 
that ranges from 0% to 100%, with 
0 representing perfect equality and 
100 representing perfect inequality 
World Development Indicator  
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
L_YearEdu 
log of secondary school enrollment 
(in percentage) used as a proxy for 
the measure of investment in human 
capital 
Barro and Lee (1994) 
See updated version at: 
www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata.ciddata.htm 
L_GovExp 
General government final 
consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
World Development Indicator 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
L_OPN 
Ratio of the sum of imports and 
exports to the GDP that provides the 
measure of openness of economy 
World Development Indicator 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
L_CPIACor 
Transparency, accountability, and 
corruption in the public sector rating 
(1=low to 6=high) 
World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
L_LF Labour Force participation ratio 
World Development Indicator 
(http://databank.worldbank.org) 
 









5.  Estimation method 
 
To carry out the analysis above described we utilised the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM). We have compared the strengths and weaknesses sides of VECM and came 
to conclusion that VECM gives us much expected result than alternative models (see Table 
3.2). 
 





VECM allows us to obtain jointly the long-
term and short-term relationships between 
variables 
We can conduct only for the series which 
are stations in their differences (I)1 
2 
VECM model would be correctly specified 
and the interpretation of results are simple 
yet intuitive 
There is much debate on how the lag 
lengths should be determined  
3 
VECM allows us to deal with both 
stationary and non-stationary variables with 
different orders of integration 
It is possible to end up with a model 
including numerous explanatory variables, 
with different signs, which has 
implications for degrees of freedom  
4 
VECM allows us to examine the serial 




VECM allows us to find the first 




The advantage of VECM over VAR is that 
the resulting VAR from VECM 
representations has more efficient 
coefficient estimates   
 
 
   In estimating the model, various analytical techniques such as unit root test, 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller,1979), ADF-GLS (generalised least 
squares) test (Fuller, 1976), KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), Variance Decomposition, 
Impulse of Response Function (Haug and Smith, 2007), and CUSUM and CUSUMQ 
stability test (Luger, 2001).  









The response of GDP per capita and Poverty level to shocks in ODA and other selected 
variables can be written as follow:  
 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡= ∝1+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−1+  ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝜔1𝑡 … … … (𝑎)  
 
𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡= ∝2+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝜔2𝑡 … … … (𝑏)   
  
𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑡= ∝3+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑂𝑉𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝜔3𝑡 … … … (𝑐)  
 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑡= ∝4+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1+ 
𝜔4𝑡 … … … (𝑑)    
     
𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡= ∝5+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑣𝑡−1 +
 𝜔5𝑡 … … … (𝑒)       
 
𝐿𝐹𝑡= ∝6+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐿𝐹𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜑𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
 𝜔6𝑡 … … … (𝑓)       
 
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡= ∝7+  ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n




j=1 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑡−1+  
𝜔7𝑡 … … … (𝑗)    
 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑡= ∝7+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗
n
j=1 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
n
j=1 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
n





j=1 𝑂𝑃𝑁𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜗𝑗
n
j=1 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑡−1+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗
n




j=1 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑡−1+  
𝜔7𝑡 … … … (ℎ)    
 
To determine the order of integration, we used three-unit root tests, the Augmented-
Dickey Fuller test (comparing AIC and BIC criterion), ADF-GLS test (comparing modified 
AIC and BIC criterion using Perron-Qu method and first differences) and KPSS unit test 
(robust estimate of variance). Results are summarised in Table 3.3. 









The results show that all variables were confirmed to be stationary except LnLF, 
LnEdu, and LnInf, which were suggesting at 1% stationary only with constant and trend. 
The LnGDPpc is stationary at 1% with constant and with constant and trend. The remaining 
variables LnODA, LnGE, LnCPIA, LnOPN, LnGINI, and LnPov are stationary at 5% and 
10% with constant and with constant and trend, respectively. 
 
Table 3.3. Summary of ADF, DF-GLS and KPSS unit root tests 
 


















𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕 -0.0816 -0.2690 -0.2737 0.1216 0.0886 
𝑳𝒏𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒕 -0.0717 -1.2621 -0.7271 0.1473 0.1418 
𝑳𝒏𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒕 -0.4482 -0.4649 -0.3185 0.1005 0.0004 
𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑬𝒕 -0.5098 -1.2262 -0.8548 0.0561 0.0232 
𝑳𝒏𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨𝒕 -0.0769 -0.3581 -0.3531 0.1476 0.0077 
𝑳𝒏𝑶𝑷𝑵𝒕 -0.2690 -0.3133 -0.3171 0.1473 0.1418 
𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑰𝒕 -0.4485 -0.4331 -0.4486 0.0854 0.0070 
𝑳𝒏𝑷𝑶𝑽𝒕 -0.1892 -0.1563 -0.2076 0.1285 0.9590 
𝑳𝒏𝑳𝑭𝒕 -0.0138 -0.0425 -0.1322 0.1763 0.0003 
Variables’ first difference  
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒑𝒄𝒕 -0.6115* -0.5965* -0.6060 0.1633 0.0401 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑶𝑫𝑨𝒕 -1.6068*** -1.6078*** -1.1059 0.0826 0.0279 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑬𝒅𝒖𝒕 -0.8774 -0.8793* -0.8791 0.0844 0.0001 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑬𝒕 -1.2158*** -1.2280*** -1.2244 0.0575 0.0247 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑪𝑷𝑰𝑨𝒕 -1.0625*** -1.0978** -1.0955 0.0790 0.0020 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑶𝑷𝑵𝒕 -1.0160*** -1.5137*** -1.0190 0.1287 0.0375 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑮𝑰𝑵𝑰𝒕 -1.0754*** -1.0836*** -1.0778 0.0928 0.0029 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑷𝑶𝑽𝒕 -0.9283*** -1.0159** -1.0111 0.1225 0.2071 
𝚫𝑳𝒏𝑳𝑭𝒕 -0.0806 -0.2800* -0.2219 0.1631 3.3202 
 
Source: Authors' computation 
Note: the lag of ADF test is determined by the AIC and BIC values.  
Lag order is shown in parenthesis based on AIC and BIC at ADF level. *  , ** and  *** indicate siginficant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
For DF-GLS  critical values after the first difference as follows: -2.89 (10%), -3.19 (5%), -3.46 (2.5%),  -
3.77(1%) 
For KPSS  critical values after the first difference: 0.125 (10%), 0.150 (5%),  0.204 (1%) 









6.  Results and Discussion 
The VECM test allows us to determine the causality direction between our selected 
variables (Table 4). The result indicates that the coefficient of GDPpc is positive (1.6865 > 
0). Furthermore, the ODA coefficient is positive (0.62408 > 0) and statistically significant 
at 1%. Consequently, we can confirm the Hypothesis 1. Accordingly, the coefficient of 
public corruption (L_CPIA) variable is negative, however it is not statistically significant. 
This indicates that the spread of corruption erodes the effectiveness of ODA in promoting 
economic growth. Corruption is a severe problem in Tajikistan, partly favoured by the 
numerous rules and regulations inherited from Soviet times. Corruption Perceptions Index 
by Transparency International (2017) reports that Tajikistan scored 21 points out of 100 on 
the 2017 report.  
The coefficient of fiscal policy variable (L_GovExp) is significant at 5% level.  This 
indicates that the level of government expenditure is an important factor of economic growth.  
 
Table 3.4. Vector Error Correction Estimates. 
Maximum likelihood estimates, observations  
1999-2016 (T = 18) 
Determinant of covariance matrix = 1.127486 
AIC = -25.5907 
BIC = -22.0292 
HQC = -25.0996 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
D_L_GDPpc 1.6865 0.750309 2.2477 0.0412 *** 
D_L_ODA/GDP 0.62408 0.433775 1.4387 0.1722* 
D_L_CPIACor −0.03843 0.359568 −0.1069 0.9164 
D_L_GovExp 0.80176 0.352051 2.2774 0.0390 ** 
D_ L_OPN 2.54193 1.31979 1.9260 0.0747 * 
D_L_Edu 0.02785 0.08983 0.3101 0.7611 
D_l_LF 0.05830 0.02279 2.5573 0.0228 ** 
 
R-squared                                  0.411288 
Adjusted R-squared                   0.374493 
Durbin-Watson                          1.603910 
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 2% level; 
***Significant at 5% level 









As expected, the coefficient of the trade openness is found to be positive and 
significant at 1% level. Fenny (2005) states that openness encourages a skilled labour force 
to contribute more to growth with the help of technology and research and development 
imports. Moreover, expectedly, the coefficient of labour force (l_LF) is found to be positive 
and significant at 5% level.  Further, the coefficient of human capital accumulation (L_Edu) 
is positive but it is not statistically significant. 
 
P-value of t-statistics are in parentheses *Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 2% level; ***Significant at 
5% level 
Table 3.5. Impact of Foreign Aid on Poverty Levels Results 
Dependent variable POV 














































R-squared 0.594105 0.321320 
Adjusted R-squared 0.514899 0.282027 
Log-likelihood 5.550056 170.04314 
Akaike criterion 4.899888  
Hannan-Quinn 6.178580  
Durbin-Watson 1.966459 1.459002 
AIC  -10.8937 
BIC  -7.3322 
HQC   -10.4026 









Table 3.5 shows the results of Model 1 (OLS) and Model 2 (VECM) regressions. The 
results of the analysis confirm our expectations. Particularly, the results reveal that GDP pc 
and ODA variables have a negative and statistically significant effect on poverty levels in 
the case of the Tajik economy. In consequence, we would confirm the hypothesis 2 put 
forward in the introduction. Model 1 suggests that GDP pc has a statistically significant 
negative impact on poverty at 1% and 5% levels. As one percentage increase in GDP 
provokes a 0.79 percentage decrease in poverty, ODA triggers a 0.0305 reduction in poverty. 
Expectedly, Model 2 suggest that ODA has a negative and statistically significant impact on 
poverty at 1% and 10%, thus confirming Hypothesis 2 put forward in the introduction. 
According to Model 2, a 1% increase in ODA and GDP pc reduce poverty in a 0.50% and 
0.48% respectively. 
 
Table 3.6.  Summary Statistics, using the observations 1998–2016 
(after the log transformation) 
 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max 
L_GDPpc 6.10 6.26 0.705 4.94 7.01 
L_OPN 4.67 4.67 0.294 4.22 5.30 
L_POV 3.04 3.44 0.866 1.59 3.96 
L_GINI 3.45 3.46 0.0654 3.30 3.53 
L_Edu 2.35 2.35 0.0164 2.33 2.37 
L_GovExp 2.38 2.41 0.210 2.11 2.69 
L_ODAGDP -13.7 -13.7 0.530 -14.4 -12.9 
L_CPIACor 0.764 0.693 0.107 0.693 0.916 
L_LF 14.8 14.8 0.173 14.5 15.0 
  Source: Authors' computation 
 
The coefficients of GINI and institutional quality have a positive and significant 
coefficient and therefore indicate that the greater inequality and higher level of corruption is 
associated with higher poverty levels in Tajikistan. 
The results confirm the finding of Mosley et al. (1987), Ijaiya and Ijaiya (2004), and 
McGillivray et al. (2006) suggesting that ODA effectiveness depends on institutional quality 
of the recipient country. 










Table 3.7. Correlation coefficients, using the observations 1998–2016 
 
   
Sourse: Authors' computation 
 
The coefficient of secondary school (L_Edu) enrolment has also a negative correlation 
with the poverty level in Model 1 and in consequence reveals that a higher skilled labour 
force in Tajikistan has played a key role in reducing poverty. 
Figure 3.4 shows the reaction in one variable due to shocks in other variable. 
Results indicate that both economic growth and poverty reduction experiment a 











L_GDPpc 1.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.5 0.4 -0.0 0.6 0.7 1.0 
L_OPN -0.6 1.0 0.4 -0.8 -0.4 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.4 
L_ODA/GDP -1.0 0.4 1.0 0.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 
L_POV 0.5 -0.8 -0.5 1.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.4 
L_GINI 0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.5 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.4 
L_Edu -0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 
L_GovExp 0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.0 -0.1 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.6 
L_CPIAcor 0.7 -0.0 -0.8 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.5 1.0 0.8 







































































Figure 3.4. Impluse of Response Function 
 
 
Sourse: Authors' computation 
Note: X axis measure the number of periods that have been passed after the impulse has been given. 





7.  Stability test result. 
 
We applied CUSUM and CUSUMQ to determine the parameter stability and monitor 
the change and the reliability of our estimation result (Brown et al., 1975). 









The CUSUM and CUSUMQ are plotted at 5% level of significance (figures 3.5 and 3.6).  
 




Source: Authors' computation. 
Note:  The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level, indicating the stability of the 
model.  
CUSUM test for stability of parameters mean of scaled residuals = 0.00516781; sigmahat = 0.131983;                        
Harvey-Collier t(11) = 1.06769 with p-value 0.308 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ (Stability test for Poverty 
reduction) 
  
Sourse: Authors' computation. 
Note:  The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level, indicating the stability of the   
model.  
CUSUM test for stability of parameters mean of scaled residuals = -0.78476; sigmahat =  1.76792;   
 
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 indicate that CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistics are well inside and 
between the critical bounds of the 5% confidence interval of parameter stability, whereas 









Figure 3.5 shows that CUSUMQ lines suggest a 1% (0.509) value outside of the 95% 






One of the main conclusions of this paper is that aid has played a crucial role in 
Tajikistan’s development and it is hard to imagine a further development of the country 
without coordinated external support from the donor community. 
Expectedly, this study confirms our two first hypotheses and reveals that there is a 
positive relationship between ODA and economic growth and a negative effect of ODA in 
poverty levels, once considered the institutional environment in Tajikistan. 
The VECM and OLS estimation show that an increase of 1% of ODA provokes a rise 
in 1.6% of per capita GDP and a 0.48% decrease in poverty levels in the case of the Tajik 
economy. Additionally, the level of corruption hinders economic development as well as 
boosts poverty levels in Tajikistan. Alesina and Dollar (2002) document that two-thirds of 
aid are spent in government consumption, which means that, in case aid is not channelled to 
productive uses, its usefulness would be reduced. Moreover, although openness seems to 
have a positive effect on GDP, it increases poverty. Government consumption contributes to 
an improvement in economic growth, however suggesting a negative effect on poverty 
reduction. 
Our results tend to put in doubt the third hypothesis put forward. In the present moment 
South-South Cooperation has become of paramount relevance in Tajikistan, especially as a 
result of the Chinese upsurge as the main aid provider for the Tajik economy. However, the 
way through which aid has been conceded does not allow us to think that these finance flows 
are going to create new job opportunities and a higher standard of living in Tajikistan. South-
South cooperation in Tajikistan remains far from being considered as a win-win 
phenomenon, due to several factors such as the government’s high indebtedness with China, 
strong commercial dependency with China, lack of a genuine industrial or agricultural 
development programme, the low quality of institutions as well as some of the conditions 
required to ease the financial flows. 
Regarding the potential utilization of this piece of research in order to better 
understand the future effectiveness of the so-called South-South cooperation, this is not but 









a case study that could shed light over the future implications of this relatively new genre of 
development cooperation. We must add that more research is needed firstly to analyse and 
compare aid concession to the other Central Asian countries, in order to acquire a broader 
vision for the entire region. Additionally, future research should compare the behaviour of 
South-South cooperation in different parts of the world, namely aid behaviour in Asia in 
comparison with Africa or South America. 
To summarise, although our empirical results suggest in general the expected signs, 
the result obtained by this study has a number of policy implications. Given the challenges 
faced by the Tajik economy, the Tajik Government needs to be responsible for the 
accountability of ODA use. Those accountability levels must be enforced and ODA should 
be channelled to favour economic growth and social sectors, with the purpose of reorienting 
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Appendix 3.1. Variables charts after the log transformation, 1998-2016. 
 
      






Sourse: Authors' computation 
Note: Sample Gini coefficient = 0.262265 
Estimate of population value = 0.276835 
